

Washington Semester Program
American University
Research Project

CROSSOVER VOTING IN
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES:
2000 AND 2004

Submitted by

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In Fulfillment of the Requirements for
Course Number GOVT-412:
Washington Semester Research Project

Fall 2005

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Summary

Unlike general elections, primary elections differ significantly from state to state. In this paper, I examine the differences in who is allowed to vote. Some people argue that primary elections should reflect the will of a party's members only while others contend that the entire community should influence primary elections. States are split over these views and thus are mostly using three different types of primary election system: closed, semiclosed, and open. In a closed primary, only registered party members can vote while in a semiclosed primary only registered party members and independents can vote. However, anyone can participate in an open primary.

I hypothesize that these different systems effect who wins the primary election, the percentage of the vote that comes from people committed to the party, and the rationale of those who crossover and vote in the primary. To test this hypothesis, I examine the last three contested presidential primary seasons (the 2000 Republican and the 2000 and 2004 Democratic). I use raw election results and exit polling reported through CNN.

I find that primary election systems never actually determined the winner in any of the three cases. However, I also find that those who affiliated with a party frequently supported different candidates than those who did not (especially in the 2000 Republican race, when Republicans strongly supported Bush while independents overwhelming backed McCain). In addition, I find that open and semiclosed primaries increased the share of the vote cast by those who do not identify with the party. In the forty-eight primary elections that I analyzed, those who considered themselves to be in the party cast on average 80% of the vote in closed primaries. That number dropped to about 65% in open primaries and about 60% in semiclosed primaries. This means that in a closer contest, the type of primary election system could be determinative in selecting the nominee.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Every other November, every state holds a general election. On that day almost all voters choose between several nominees for various offices in a remarkably uniform process. However, this uniformity stands in stark contrast to the process of selecting those nominees. Rules for primary elections or their functional equivalent vary tremendously from state to state. States hold primaries on different days, stretching from March to September and including every month in between. Also, some are conducted on just one day while others may require an additional primary runoff election or action within the state party hierarchy.¹ This paper focuses on another critical difference: the incredibly different rules on who is allowed to vote. As I shall discuss below, some states allow only party members to vote while others allow more open contests.

The normative debate behind states' different policies in this area is essentially over what the role of a nominee is and what s/he represents. On the one hand is a party-centric view that sees nominees as the general election representatives of groups of citizens organized around certain beliefs and principles (parties). Under this view, parties play a pivotal and necessary role in electing public officials by guaranteeing that people of similar views have the right to organize and influence elections. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed a similar principal in *California Democratic Party v. Jones*, in which the Court held 7-2 that the blanket primary, a particular type of primary election system (see Chapter 2), was unconstitutional. The Court stated that, "Representative democracy in any populous unit of government is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who

¹ Peter F. Galderisi and Marni Ezra, "Congressional Primaries in Historical and Theoretical Context," in *Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001) 16-23.

espouse their political views.”² Out of this notion comes the concept of nominees, or representatives from each party who campaign in a general election for the support of the entire community. What also results is a notion of party membership and exclusivity. Only those affiliated with and committed to a party can participate in its business and help to determine its policies and strategies. Thus selecting a nominee should be an internal affair decided by the party’s members.

On the other side is a view that emphasizes the role of the electorate as a whole. In this view, since the ultimate goal of elections is to choose public officials who lead everyone, it is important for the overall community not just to elect their leaders but also to have some say in who is put on the general election ballot. This view therefore holds that nominations decided by only party members muffle the will of the entire electorate. They give voters who do not hold party membership less say and enable only party-backed candidates to hold office.³ A 1996 ballot statement argued this when Californians were voting on whether to adopt a blanket primary, which allowed non-members to participate: “California’s closed primary election system... excludes 1.5 million independent voters from voting in primary elections at all. It favors the election of party hard-liners, contributes to legislative gridlock, and stacks the deck against more moderate problem-solvers.”⁴ The implication of this argument is that primary elections should not be under the strict control of party members. They should be more open and accessible to all voters.

² Antonin Scalia, Opinion of the Court in *California Democratic Party v. Jones* 530 U.S. 567, U.S. Supreme Court, decided 26 June, 2000 (online, available: <<http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/99-401P.ZO>>, 25 September 2005) 6.

³ There are, of course, provisions that give general election ballot access to independent candidates. However, the fact of the matter is that independents only win very rarely.

⁴ Quoted in Shawn Bowler and Todd Donovan, “Political Reform via the Initiative Process: What Voters Think about When They Change the Rules,” in *Voting at the Political Fault Line: California’s Experiment with the Blanket Primary* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002) 43.

As the situation stands today, states have come down on both sides of this question, and some have sought compromises in the middle. The question before this paper is whether these various systems actually do produce different results. Theoretically, several scenarios are possible when primaries are opened to non-members. One is that huge numbers of non-members would vote, thereby overwhelming the members and taking control of the process. On the other hand, non-members could stay at home and have little impact; or, even if most of them did vote, they might not be numerous enough to change the results. Additionally, a mixture of these scenarios may occur: non-members would vote in large numbers but only enough to change the results sometimes. Only empirical analysis can determine which scenario occurs in those states with more accessible primaries.

It is also critical to answer two other questions. First, to what degree do non-members and members disagree when they vote? If non-members largely vote the same way as members, then the impact of more accessible primaries greatly diminishes. Second, are non-members voting because they truly want to, or are they seeking to hijack the process? Party activists have good reason to be concerned if outsiders are voting with bad intentions. Again, only empirical analysis can give answers.

To do this analysis, I compare in this paper how various primary election systems produce different outcomes during presidential primary elections by examining actual results and exit polling from the last three contested races: the 2000 Democratic and Republican primaries and the 2004 Democratic primaries. One benefit of examining presidential elections is that they are the only contest in which the same candidates are constant across multiple types of primary election systems. The downside is that this paper's findings cannot necessarily be applied to

other primary elections, whether they be statewide or local.⁵ Thus this paper looks at an important facet—but only a facet—of the difference between more exclusionary and more accessible primaries. In Chapter 2, I lay out some definitions and describe specific types of primary election systems. I also develop standards of comparison for them. I then outline my sources and data in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I present the three case studies. In each, I go through the data, provide counterfactual analysis, and then conclude with a summary of my findings. Finally, I synthesize the case studies and provide some overall conclusions and implications in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2: THEORY

I begin this chapter with some key definitions. The next section divides the states' primary election systems into different groups and discusses each group's distinctive features. I then present other factors influencing primary election systems, and finally, I develop a method for comparing the impact of the different primary election systems.

Definitions

A *general election* is an election that actually determines who will hold a public office while a *primary election* is any prior election held by regular voters to determine who is placed on the ballot in a general election. A *nominee* is someone who has been selected by a party to be on a general election ballot while a *candidate* is someone who either is trying to become a nominee or has gained access to a general election ballot without going through a party

⁵ For an analysis of the impact of primary election systems on congressional primaries, see Haeberle 1985. For an analysis of statewide races within California, see Sides, Cohen and Citrin 1999 and Salvanto and Wattenberg 2002. For California local races, see Gaines and Cho 2002 and Alvarez and Nagler 2002.

nomination process (such as an independent candidate). Nominees can be and often are also referred to as “candidates,” but for the sake of clarity I will not do so in this paper.

Finally, it is critical to distinguish between a *party registrant* and a *party identifier*. A party registrant is someone who has officially associated with a party either by registering or by some other means. A party identifier is someone who in her/his own mind identifies with a party irrespective of whether s/he has registered in it. For short hand in this paper, I use “Party-Regs” for party registrants. When referring to a particular party, I use “Dem-Regs” or “Rep-Regs.” Those who are voters but are not registered in a party are “Ind-Regs.” Party identifiers are “Party-IDs” (and “Dem-IDs” or “Rep-IDs”). I call those voters who do not identify with any party “Ind-IDs.”⁶ It is important to remember that someone can be a Party-ID of one party but a Party-Reg of another. For instance, someone may have once been a Rep-ID and thus became a Rep-Reg but over the years evolved into a Dem-ID but did not take the time to reregister. That person would be a Dem-ID but still a Rep-Reg. Likewise, a person could be a Rep-ID but not be registered in a party, making that person also an Ind-Reg.

The Different Primary Election Systems

While there is more than one way to categorize the states’ variously primary election systems⁷, I have chosen to divide them into five groups:

⁶ Wekin 1988 wisely argues that just to think in terms of Dem-IDs, Rep-IDs, and Ind-IDs is too oversimplified. In reality, voter identification falls along a spectrum with most people having at least some sympathy with a party, and thus we should break people into seven groups: strong party identifiers (both Dem and Rep), weak party identifiers (both Dem and Rep), independents who lean towards a party (both Dem and Rep), and pure independents. Unfortunately, such a breakdown is not practical here, and the exit polling data that I use only divided voters into the three main groups.

⁷ See Kanthak and Norton 2001 for an alternative categorization scheme.

Closed Primary: In this system, only those who were Party-Regs prior to the primary can vote. To become a Party-Reg, a voter needs to have registered through a voter registration form or taken some comparable action. Only those who had already taken that step can vote. For instance, at the polls only Dem-Regs receive Democratic ballots, and the Dem-Regs themselves cannot ask for a different ballot. This system forces the voter to incur at least some opportunity cost: they had to take the time to register themselves in advance, face scrutiny from others who know their Party-Reg status⁸, and also forego participation in any other parties' primaries.

Semiclosed Primary (also known as a Modified Open Primary or Modified Closed Primary): This is like a closed primary in that Party-Regs of other parties cannot participate. However, depending on the state, they either force parties to include Ind-Regs or give parties the option to include Ind-Regs. Interestingly, this system actually gives Ind-Regs greater voting rights than Party-Pegs since Party-Regs are limited to vote only in their own primary but Ind-Regs get to choose one of potentially several primaries. For instance, a Rep-Reg goes to the polls and automatically gets a Republican ballot, but an Ind-Reg gets to pick his/er ballot for him/erself.

Open Primary: This system is even more accessible than the semiclosed primary. In open primary states, there may not even be party registration at all. When a primary election occurs, all voters can vote in whichever party's primary they wish. For instance, someone may

⁸ In my home state of California, which allows people to register on their voter registration form, Party-Reg information is not—strictly speaking—accessible to the public. However, parties are permitted to access voter lists containing Party-Reg information and give these lists to their volunteers. For instance, when I was precinct walking in my neighborhood, I knew the Party-Reg status of all of my neighbors. Also, on election days, poll workers posted voter registration lists containing Party-Reg information on a wall by the polling place. Anyone can go over and peruse the list.

be a Dem-ID but cannot become a Dem-Reg because there is no registration. The Dem-ID simply goes to the polls and uses a Democratic ballot. Likewise, Ind-IDs can go and select whichever ballot they want. This system minimizes the opportunity cost of voting in a primary and makes it easy for Ind-IDs to participate in a party's primary if they wish.

Blanket Primary: This system was even more accessible than the open primary until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in *California Democratic Party v. Jones*. All voters received the exact same ballot with all parties' primary elections for all races listed. Voters could then choose on a race-by-race basis the party primary in which they would participate. For instance, someone could vote in the Democratic primary for state attorney general while voting in the Republican primary for U.S. representative. Such a system essentially eliminated the opportunity cost of voting in a primary. Not only were blanket primary voters not restricted by prior Party-Reg decisions, but they (unlike any other voter) do not even incur the cost of forgoing participation in other parties' primaries for other offices.

Nonpartisan Primary (also known as the Louisiana Primary): The final system is an anomaly in American politics. It exists only in Louisiana and is not even a primary based on this paper's definition. While all other states have been choosing nominees prior to the November general election, Louisiana never chooses nominees and instead puts all candidates regardless of party on the same general election ballot. All voters are then able to vote for any candidate. If one candidate garners a majority, that candidate wins. If no one gets a majority, a second round of the general election occurs in a December runoff between the two top candidates regardless of their party. Thus a general election can come down to two candidates of the same party.

I compare only the first three types in this paper. Because the blanket primary is no longer legal and was never fully used in either the 2000 or 2004 presidential primaries, I do not analyze it in this paper. I also do not include the so-called nonpartisan primary both because it is not actually a primary based on this paper's definition (since it contains no nominating process) and because Louisiana never appears in any of the case studies. Thus the three independent variables in this paper are the closed, semiclosed, and open primaries.

Three Other Factors in Primary Election Systems

In addition to this five-category division of primary election systems, there are three other factors that can greatly affect a nomination process. While they do not directly pertain to this paper, I should note them here.

Runoffs: Some states use primary runoff elections. If no candidate gets a certain amount of the vote (usually 40% or 50%) in the first primary election, then the top two candidates advance to another (the runoff) and the winner of that election becomes the nominee. A runoff can be attached to at least the closed, semiclosed, and open primaries. However, this is never done in presidential primaries.

State Party Conventions: Conventions—composed of state party delegates who are likely very committed Part-IDs—can sometimes replace or have influence over parts of the primary election process.⁹ This influence can be as modest as giving the primary candidate

⁹ See Galderisi and Ezra 2001 for a good specific discussion of how this occurs in each state where party conventions play a roll.

whom the convention supports a place on the first line of a primary ballot. It can also be much more decisive. For instance, in Utah, if a candidate gets 70% or more of the vote at the state party convention held prior to the primary election, that candidate automatically becomes the nominee. If no candidate gets 70%, the convention still wields tremendous influence by selecting the only two candidates who can run in the primary election. Three states (Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia) even allow their parties to skip a primary election altogether and just have their state party convention pick nominees directly—although this option is rarely actually used.¹⁰ However, it is more common for state conventions to be major actors in the presidential nominating process. Nevertheless, since this paper looks at direct voter behavior in selecting nominees, I only include in my sample those states that hold presidential primary elections.

Caucuses: Specifically in the presidential nominating process, some states do not use a primary election at all but what is known as a caucus. In a caucus, instead of going to the polls and voting, voters attend a local party meeting at which they elect delegates to a local or state party convention who are supportive of a particular presidential candidate. Since voting in the traditional sense (at a polling place or through the mail, with a secret ballot, etc.) does not occur, caucuses are sufficiently different from a primary election that I will also exclude them from my sample.¹¹

¹⁰ Galderisi and Ezra, “Congressional Primaries,” 16-20.

¹¹ Also, since exit polling is harder to do at caucuses, I have little data from them to use.

Process for Comparing Primary Election Systems

When comparing the three independent variables (closed, semiclosed, and open primaries), what dependent variables are there to track? My hypothesis is that there are three. I describe each one below.

Winner: The ultimate question in comparing primary election systems is whether they produce a different winner. Sometimes this can be very easy to answer. For instance, when comparing semiclosed to closed primaries and when exit polling data is available broken down into Party-Regs and Ind-Regs, one must simply look to see whether the winner among Party-Regs differed from the actual winner. Often, however, it is far more difficult and requires intelligent guessing. At the end of each case study, I will include a short counterfactual analysis section in which I try to determine if the nominee would have been different had all of the primaries been done through one system.¹²

Percentage of Votes Cast by Party-IDs: A critical factor in my analysis is the percentage of the total vote coming from Party-IDs, which in this paper I call the “Party-ID percentage.” My hypothesis is that closed primaries should have the highest Party-ID percentage because only Party-Regs can participate in them.¹³ I expect that the Party-ID percentage will then drop in semiclosed primaries and then drop even more in open primaries since they are increasingly accessible to non-Party-IDs. It will also be important to watch the extent of the drop

¹² There are two types of possible counterfactual analysis when examining elections. The first analyzes what would have happened if the campaign season had been exactly the same as it actually was but on Election Day itself the primary election system had magically changed. The other analyzes what would have happened had the primary election system been different all along and the candidates, voters, and media had changed their behavior accordingly throughout the campaign. While this latter type is important, it is much more speculative, and I will not try to take it on in this paper.

¹³ Although remember that even in closed primaries the number should not be at 100% since not all Party-Regs are Party-IDs.

(if there is one). For instance, if closed primaries have a 90% Party-ID percentage and the number crashes to 20% in open primaries, that would indicate that the party-faithful are completely overrun when the primary becomes more accessible. However, if the number only shifts from, say, 80% to 75%, that would indicate that greater accessibility does not bring in many new people.

Types of Crossover: As mentioned in Chapter 1, when non-Party-IDs enter into a party's primary to vote, they may have a variety of motives. They could be there because they honestly wanted to vote in that party's primary, or they could have more devious intentions. It is thus important to see whether different primary election systems promote certain motivations for people to *crossover* (which I define for this paper as the act of voting in a primary by a non-Party-ID). I am adopting Cain and Gerber's model for subdividing crossover behavior into three types.¹⁴

Sincere crossover voting is when a voter honestly supports a candidate in another party. This could happen if the voter has a special affinity with that candidate or if the voter (if s/he is a Party-ID elsewhere) is just unsatisfied with all of her/his own party's candidates. Regardless, the voter is fully committed to the candidate and intends to support that candidate in the general election. As Cain and Gerber put it, "if a voter were to rank order the candidates for a given office and then cast a ballot for the one with the highest ranking, the voter would be voting sincerely."¹⁵

¹⁴ Bruce E. Cain and Elisabeth R. Gerber, "California's Blanket Primary Experiment," in *Voting at the Political Fault Line: California's Experiment with the Blanket Primary* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002) 6-7.

¹⁵ Cain and Gerber, "California's Blanket," 6.

Hedging differs from sincere crossover voting because the voter does not intend to support that candidate in the general election. Rather the voter perceives that there is a contested race going on in another party and views one of the candidates in that party as better than the others (although still inferior to the voter's own candidate). The voter thus crosses over and votes for the best candidate in the other party to try to raise the overall caliber of nominees in the general election. In other words, the voter is "hedging" his/er general election bets to ensure that if his/er nominee loses, at least a somewhat acceptable nominee is elected.¹⁶ A voter might do this because the other party's primary is not particularly contested, or a voter might simply do this because the bad candidate is so unacceptable that stopping that candidate is worth giving up a vote for his/er truly preferred candidate.

The third type, *raiding*, is like hedging in that a voter crosses over while intending to vote for a different candidate in the general election. However, in raiding someone votes for the perceived weakest candidate in the other party so that the voter's nominee will have an easier chance of winning the general election. For obvious reasons, the prospect of raiding is troubling to Party-IDs who do not want their nomination processes hijacked by such tactics.¹⁷

¹⁶ Alvarez and Nagler 2002 identify a fourth group that they call *impact voting* which could arguably be classified as a type of hedging. Impact voting happens when there is a party that is completely dominant in the jurisdiction in which the election is occurring. A voter from another party, realizing that the other party's nominee will be elected no matter what, crosses over simply to have some say in the final outcome even if it is only by choosing among poor candidates.

¹⁷ I have written this subsection with presidential primaries in mind. Since they are often held alone without simultaneous votes for other races, these categorizations do not cover all votes in multi-race elections. For instance, they do not explain how to classify votes in races that did not prompt the crossover. For instance, if a voter crosses over sincerely to support a candidate for state treasurer and thereby finds her/himself also voting in another party's primary for state controller among candidates s/he does not necessarily support, as what should such a vote be labeled? I will not try to answer that question here.

Summary of Theory

In short, in this paper I compare three primary election systems (closed, semiclosed, and open) in the last three contested presidential primary campaigns. As I do so, I ask three main questions. (1) Would changing primary election systems have changed the ultimate winner of the nomination? (2) How significantly does the Party-ID percentage differ among the primary election systems? (3) Do different primary election systems encourage differing types of crossover (sincere, hedging, and raiding)?

Answering these questions is critical to the normative debate that I introduced at the beginning. Those who support broader participation want open and semiclosed primaries to bring new people into the process. Those new people can be detected if open and semiclosed primaries either produce (at least sometimes) different nominees than closed primaries or see a drop in the Party-ID percentage. Meanwhile, those with a party-centric view want open and semiclosed primaries to be impotent and closely mirror closed primaries. They particularly want the Party-ID percentage always to remain high and the number of hedgers and raiders always to remain low.

In short, the overarching question is this: how different are the effects of these three primary election systems? If they are quite similar, then the two sides are having a meaningless debate since adopting one system over the other does not produce a different result. However, if the three produce very different effects, then both sides will have a very strong interest in adopting a system consistent with its views. In the case studies below, I try to determine which scenario is more accurate.

CHAPTER 3: METHODS

My two main sources of numerical data are actual election results and exit polling. Almost all of the actual results come from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in reports available on their website. California tabulated unique data (for reasons that differ in 2000 and 2004 and are discussed briefly below), and for these numbers I used the California Department of State's official report of election results which is available on its website. I include more specific URL information for both the FEC and the California secretary of state in the bibliography. The only other source of election results is for the Iowa Caucuses, for which I used CNN.

The exit polling data comes from CNN and is available from a fairly extensive archive which it keep on its website.¹⁸ I used most of the data that pertains to this topic (which was only a fraction of the total that it had collected) and rearranged it significantly to get it into its present form in the tables. In 2000, CNN did not specify its own source for the data in each state, but at least the bulk came from the Voter News Service (VNS). In 2004, CNN's data came through Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International which surveyed between 898 and 2513 people in each state covered in this paper. In both years the exit polling was performed at polling places but was sometimes supplemented by telephone surveys.¹⁹ In all three races, exit polling continued even after the race stopped being competitive (which is the cutoff point for this paper's analysis).

¹⁸ However, the relevant pages are buried deep within the site. The best way to access the 2000 data is to go to its New Hampshire Republican page at <<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html>>. From there, one can navigate to other states. For 2004, the best starting point is <<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/primaries/pages/epolls/NH/index.html>>.

¹⁹ For more detailed information on the exit pollsters' methods, go for 2000 to <<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/resources/explainer.html>>. For 2004, go to <<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/primaries/pages/misc/exit.html>>.

To determine the primary election system used in each state, I used The Green Papers, an excellent website that records detailed information on presidential election results and procedures. It recorded each state's system in some detail for both years.²⁰ I also verified this information by running it against data from CNN (for 2004) and from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.²¹ In a few cases, these sources disagreed among themselves, and then I had to reach a determination for myself on how best to classify the states.²²

In all states covered in this paper, exit polling data was collected on Party-IDs. In only semiclosed states was Party-Reg data collected, and then only some of the time. Some other collected data also pertains to this paper, including breakdowns based on prior participation in the party's primary and primary election system preference. Unfortunately, there is very limited data that directly sheds light on crossover type. In the 2000 Super Tuesday primaries, VNS collected data based on intended general election vote. Beyond that, almost no other data directly pertaining to crossover type is available.

Because the contested portion of a presidential primary election season lasts a long time (over a month in all three of these cases), I cannot analyze all of these primaries as a group. Numerous factors can evolve over the course of a campaign, including the dynamics of the race, the perceptions and preferences of the voters, and (especially in 2004) the number of candidates. Thus I analyze primaries separately by the day on which they occur. For each day, I provide a summary of the results and as appropriate go into the larger context of the campaign. I then analyze the breakdowns by Party-ID and, when collected, Party-Regs and other breakdowns. As

²⁰ For 2000, begin at <<http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCC/StAll.html>>. For 2004, begin at <<http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P04/events.phtml?format=alphabetical>>.

²¹ For CNN, go to <<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/special/president/primary.explainer/frameset.exclude.html>>. For Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, go to <<http://uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT>>.

²² There were only two troublesome instances of this. The first was for all of the Ohio primaries, which I am labeling as all open. The second was over the 2004 Democratic South Carolina Primary which I will also consider to be open. For the reasons described later, some of them also found California's 2000 and 2004 systems confusing.

I said in Chapter 2, I do not analyze caucuses. I also do not analyze those few primaries for which exit polling was not conducted. Even so, when a race that I am not analyzing occurs in the chronology, I try to mention it. I however completely skip primaries or caucuses held in U.S. territories or among Americans abroad. At the end of each case study, I bring all of the primaries together and analyze them as a group to see what impact primary election systems had. After that I give counterfactual analysis to see if changing the primary election systems could have fundamentally changed the outcome and produced a different nominee. Finally, I conclude each case study with a brief summary of my overall findings.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

CASE STUDY 1: THE 2000 REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

Texas Gov. George W. Bush entered the first Republican contests the strong frontrunner as a reliably but not extremely conservative candidate. Early in the campaign, he had garnered the support of a broad array of leading Republican officials, built a huge campaign war chest, and had already forced several of his opponents out of the race. By January of 2000, his main challenger appeared to be Arizona Sen. John McCain, an independently-minded candidate known for promoting campaign finance reform. McCain consistently stressed his goal to generate a large crossover vote, an effort that became encapsulated in his often repeated “libertarians, vegetarians” statement: “Come onboard. Come on, independents, come on, Democrats, libertarians, vegetarians, all of you, join our banner.”²³ Meanwhile, also running were *FORBES* magazine Editor-in-Chief Steve Forbes, an outsider who touted a flat-tax and

²³ CNN, “On Eve of Super Tuesday, McCain and Bush Campaign in Critical California; Gore Likely to Sweep Bradley in Super Tuesday Contests,” 6 March, 2000, online, available: <<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/06/ip.00.html>>, 9 November, 2005.

conservative social policies, and three other conservatives who were trailing badly in the polls: former Family Research Council President Gary Bauer, former radio talk-show host Alan Keyes, and Utah Sen. Orrin Hatch. On January 24, Bush cemented his frontrunner status by defeating Forbes 41%-30% in the critical Iowa Caucuses, the first major contest of the election. Keyes received 14%, followed by Bauer with 9%. McCain, who skipped the race, garnered 5%, and Hatch, who came in last place with 1%, dropped out. Bush then turned to the similarly-critical New Hampshire Primary, the first primary election of the season and the first contest in which he would face McCain.

February 1: New Hampshire

A Bush victory in the semiclosed New Hampshire Primary would quite possibly have given him irreversible momentum and effectively ended the contest. Instead, McCain thumped Bush 49%-30% (table 1). Forbes came in a disappointing distant third with 13%, and Keyes garnered 6%. Bauer's poor 1% showing caused him to drop out a few days later. Significantly, Bush actually won among Rep-IDs 41%-38%, but the Rep-ID percentage was only 53%. McCain countered this with overwhelming victories among Ind-IDs (who cast 41% of the total vote), 62%-19%, and Dem-IDs (4%), 78%-13%. Thus a clear gap was developing between Party-IDs and non-Party-IDs (Ind-IDs and Dem-IDs).

However, the gap was not so severe when the data broke down by Party-Reg. 63% of voters were Rep-Regs. 32% were Ind-Regs, and another 5% had not been registered at all prior to the election. While McCain won all three groups, he did significantly better among Ind-Regs, overwhelming Bush 61%-19%. McCain carried Rep-Regs 44%-35%. Interestingly, Bush did

best among previously unregistered voters, holding McCain to a 44%-41% margin.²⁴ However, considering the fact that he won Rep-Regs, McCain still would have won if the primary had been closed (and thus only Rep-Regs had been voting). Finally, it is also important to note that Ind-Regs and Ind-IDs do not necessarily vote for the most moderate candidate: while McCain did much better among them than among Rep-Regs and Rep-IDs, the conservative Forbes did about the same.

February 8: Delaware

With McCain skipping the contest, Forbes hoped to regain momentum in what was one of two states that he had won in his 1996 presidential campaign. However, Bush won the closed primary with a solid 51% (table 1). Forbes garnered only 20%, coming in behind McCain's 25% despite McCain not having aggressively sought votes. Keyes received 4%. Forbes fell out soon thereafter leaving behind only Bush and McCain as viable candidates. Keyes stayed in the race for the rest of the campaign, but he never gained momentum and mostly remained in the single digits.

Overall, the makeup of Delaware voters was very different than New Hampshire's. The closed contest saw a high Party-ID percentage of 80%, far greater than New Hampshire's 53%. Bush was the strong favorite of Rep-IDs, beating McCain 56%-21% among them. As they had in New Hampshire, Ind-IDs sided with McCain decisively, 45%-26%. However, since this time they only comprised 18% of all voters, they did not affect the outcome. As before, Ind-IDs did not simply vote for the moderate: Forbes actually did better among Ind-IDs (garnering 25%) than Rep-IDs (19%).

²⁴ Voters were also asked whether they had considered voting for Gore or Bradley in the Democratic primary and whether they would consider voting for the Reform Party. Because these questions only regard a voter's prior consideration and not actual intention, I am choosing not to analyze them in this paper.

February 19: South Carolina

With Bush still reeling from his loss in New Hampshire, the campaign moved to the conservative south. However, because South Carolina's primary was open and there was no Democratic contest occurring on the same day, McCain again hoped for significant crossover support. On the day before the election, he once again repeated his "libertarians, vegetarians" line: "I say to independents, Democrats, libertarians, vegetarians, come on over, vote for me tomorrow and I'll give you your dream."²⁵ But it was not to be: Bush rallied back and defeated McCain 53%-42% (table 2).

Exit polling shows a huge fracturing between those within the party and those who had crossed over from outside. Rep-IDs comprised 61% of all voters and supported Bush by an overwhelming 69%-26%. However, Ind-IDs (30% of the total) supported McCain by a decisive 60%-34%, and among Dem-IDs (a notable 9% of the total) McCain won 79%-18%. The exit poll also asked people if they had voted before in a Republican primary. Among those who had (68%), Bush won decisively, 59%-36%. However, a significant 31% had not voted in a GOP primary before, and they supported McCain 53%-42%. While a large portion of these new voters could have been young voters who were committed to the party but had not yet had an opportunity to vote, many were likely people who responded to McCain's efforts and used the open primary system to vote in a party to which they had no connection.²⁶

²⁵ CNN, "John McCain looks for New Hampshire Magic in South Carolina," 19 February, 2000, online, available: <<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0002/19/smn.01.html>>, 9 November, 2005.

²⁶ Voters were also asked whether they preferred a candidate who was loyal to the party. While data from this question does pertain to this paper, in the interests of brevity I have decided not to include analysis of it both here and elsewhere.

February 22: Arizona and Michigan

McCain's defeat in South Carolina made the next two primaries, Arizona and Michigan, all the more important. Arizona, McCain's home state, supported him by a landslide 60%-36%—despite the fact that it was a closed primary. For the first time, he won Rep-IDs (who comprised 80% of the vote), carrying them 56%-41%. However, he continued his trend of doing far better among Ind-IDs and won them 72%-20%. It is important to note that since McCain was a favorite son candidate in Arizona, not too much should be read into these results.

The real battle of the night was in Michigan, which reversed the fortunes in the race yet again. Like South Carolina, Michigan was open, and once again McCain had been trying to generate a crossover vote that was strong enough to propel him to victory. This time he was successful. McCain defeated Bush 51%-43% (table 2). Ind-IDs made up 35% of the total vote and supported McCain 67%-26%. Dem-IDs, like in South Carolina, did not have an election of their own that day, and crossed over so much that they comprised a remarkable 17% of the vote, and they supported McCain 82%-10%. Rep-IDs, meanwhile, supported Bush by an overwhelming 66%-29%, but crossover was so great that Rep-IDs contributed only 48% of the vote, essentially becoming a minority in their own party. The 68% of voters who had participated in a Republican primary before also supported Bush, narrowly backing him 48%-46%. However, the 30% of new voters supported McCain 64%-30%.²⁷ Bush was openly frustrated that his clear victory among his party's base had actually translated into a defeat, and he spoke out publicly against the fact that Dem-IDs had been able to play such a significant role. At a rally that night

²⁷ In both Arizona and Michigan, voters were also asked whether they preferred a candidate who was loyal to the party (see the previous note).

he proclaimed, “Among Republicans and independents, there is no question who the winner is in Michigan tonight, and you're looking at him.”²⁸

Thus the battle-lines in the Bush-McCain fight were drawn: Bush had now (with the exception of Arizona) consistently won Rep-IDs in every single race, including by more than two-to-one in Michigan. McCain had overwhelmingly won Ind-IDs and (when statistically significant enough to count) Dem-IDs in every race. The question for the rest of the campaign would be basically one of turnout: how many non-Rep-IDs could McCain get to the polls, and would they be numerous enough to outdo the Rep-IDs?

February 29: Virginia

The campaign then turned to three races on February 29. In the open Virginia Primary²⁹, Bush won Rep-IDs overwhelmingly, 69%-28%, and McCain won by large margins among Ind-IDs (64%-31%) and Dem-IDs (87%-11%) (table 2). These numbers were all almost identical to those in Michigan. However, this time, Rep-IDs were able to cast a much larger share of the vote (63%, up from their 48% in Michigan). This was enough to tilt the race back to Bush, and he won 53%-44%. Interestingly, the exit poll also asked voters if they supported having a closed or open primary. An open primary was preferred 49%-48%. Among those who supported an open primary, McCain won 71%-26%. Bush, however, swept those who supported a closed primary 81%-16%.³⁰ With this victory along with wins in North Dakota and Washington³¹, Bush was

²⁸ Ian Christopher McCaleb, “McCain recovers from South Carolina disappointment, wins in Arizona, Michigan,” 22 February, 2000, CNN, online, available: <<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/02/22/gop.wrap>>, 9 November, 2005.

²⁹ Virginia’s primary is open, but according to The Green Papers, “Voters are asked to sign the following pledge before voting: ‘I, the undersigned, state that I do not intend to participate in the nomination process of any other party than the Republican Party.’” See <<http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCC/VA-R.html>>. What effect if any this had on non-Rep-IDs’ willingness to participate is hard to tell.

³⁰ They also broke the numbers down by primary election system preference among just Rep-IDs. In addition, they also asked whether voters preferred a candidate who was loyal to the party and whom voters would support in a

able to regain his momentum going into Super Tuesday, a collection of eleven primaries and two caucuses that had the potential to be the apex of the campaign.

March 7: Super Tuesday

Overview: Bush won what were by far the three biggest prizes of the night (California, Ohio, and New York³²), and also rolled up victories in Georgia, Maine, Maryland, and Missouri (table 3) as well as in the Minnesota and Washington Caucuses. McCain received some good news in New England, winning four primaries (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont), but those were not nearly enough to counter Bush's wins. McCain soon raised the white flag and suspended his campaign. Bush had won the Republican nomination.

How Party-IDs Voted: Bush won Rep-IDs in all eleven primaries, receiving over 60% support in six states. McCain won Ind-IDs everywhere except Georgia, doing so in five states with over 60% support. Where Dem-IDs were statistically significant enough to be counted, McCain won among them every time and often by overwhelming margins. Overall, the races came down to Rep-ID percentage. In the three closed states, Rep-IDs made up between 72% and 82% of the total, and Bush won two of the three. The only exception was Connecticut, a fairly liberal state where McCain squeaked by 49%-46%. In the four semiclosed states, two (Maine and Maryland) had Rep-ID percentages in the 60s, and Bush won both. The other two (Massachusetts

Gore-Bush and Gore-McCain general election match-up. For brevity's sake, I confine analysis of general election match-ups to the Super Tuesday primaries.

³¹ North Dakota held caucuses. Washington had an odd configuration. The contest was a primary, but it only counted for some of the delegates. The rest were earned in caucuses held on March 7. For more information, see The Green Papers at <<http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCC/WA-R.html#Open>>. Most importantly for this paper, there was no exit polling.

³² In New York, people voted directly for delegates in each congressional district. Delegate candidates were listed with the name of the presidential candidate whom they support. Keyes's campaign was not on the ballot in four districts, which slightly affected the results. For more, see The Green Papers <<http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCC/NY-R.html>>.

and Rhode Island) saw the Rep-ID percentage go down to an incredibly low 37% and 40%, respectively. In both, McCain won landslide victories. The four open states were somewhat less spread apart. Three were in the 60s, and Bush won all of these. The fourth (Vermont) was at 50% and went to McCain.

How Party-Regs Voted: VNS collected Party-Reg data in the four semiclosed states. In two (Maine and Maryland), Rep-Regs comprised over 80% of the vote and in both cases supported Bush fairly decisively. However, in the other two states (Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the same states that saw the Rep-ID percentage go very low), Ind-Regs actually outnumbered Rep-Regs (in both cases 62%-38%). Thus, despite Bush's narrow 49%-48% lead among Rep-Regs in Massachusetts³³ and 55%-42% victory in Rhode Island, McCain's overwhelming support among Ind-Regs tipped the scales dramatically in his favor and he won decisively in both. Thus, in these two cases, had the primary been closed instead of semiclosed, the winner would have been different in Rhode Island and maybe also Massachusetts.

Other Breakdowns: Among those who had never voted in a Republican primary before, McCain won in all ten states that produced a statistically significant sample. Among those who had voted before (who were dominant, comprising between 72% and 94% of the total vote), results were more split, generally reflecting the overall result: the state's winner carried this group in ten of the eleven primaries with the only exception being Connecticut, where Bush and McCain tied 48%-48% among those who had participated before. There is also data from about half the states on voter preferences between a closed or open primary. Bush won among those

³³ Since these numbers are of course not from the actual data but from exit polling, the winner cannot be conclusively determined based on such a closely-divided sample.

who preferred a closed primary every time, indicating again that he was popular among those most committed to the party. Among those who preferred an open primary (who were the majority in every state but Connecticut), the overall winner won them each time.³⁴

California Results: California was a unique situation and provided interesting additional data. At the time, California was a blanket primary state, but because the Democratic and Republican Parties insisted that only their members could vote in the primary, state law enabled the secretary of state to tabulate the results based on Party-Reg and publish those numbers. Thus we know exactly how many Dem-Regs, Rep-Regs, members of California's five minor parties, and Decline to States (Ind-Regs) voted for each candidate (table 4). Overall, Bush defeated McCain 52%-43%. However, among Rep-Regs (the only voters who counted), Bush won by a much larger 61%-35%. Rep-Regs comprised 69% of the total vote. McCain, however, won the support of Dem-Regs (who made up 19%) by a large 61%-34% margin. McCain won Ind-Regs (10%) 54%-40% and also carried all five minor parties. These numbers reaffirm again Bush's popularity among the party's core and McCain's support among crossovers.³⁵

Data on Types of Crossover: VNS also collected data on how primary participants intended to vote in the general election in both a race between Bush and Gore and between McCain and Gore. In every instance, large majorities of primary participants were willing to support both Republicans. However, a notably larger group was prepared to vote for Gore if

³⁴ VNS also reported additional data that pertains to this paper but which I do not examine. In several states, it divided out Republicans and analyzed primary election system preference among just them. Voters in some states were also asked whether they preferred a candidate who was loyal to the party. Republicans were separated out and analyzed for this question too. In Maine, voters were asked if they had voted for Ross Perot before.

³⁵ In California, VNS also asked Rep-Regs whether they thought that the winner of the blanket primary or of the reconstructed closed primary should be the winner. Rep-Regs thought 61%-30% that the overall winner should win. VNS also asked the total sample some interesting questions pertaining to the blanket primary.

Bush was nominated than if McCain was. The number of voters who would support Gore over McCain never exceeded 13% in any state. However, in nine of the eleven states, those who would support Gore over Bush exceeded 15% and in three states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont) the number was greater than 25%. These figures are the best evidence for what types of crossover were occurring.

To analyze this data, I separated the crossovers into four groups (table 5). Of those who would support Gore over Bush in the general election, the vast majority supported McCain. Likewise, those who would vote for Gore over McCain largely voted for Bush. People in these two groups could be any of the three crossover types. They could be sincere because they supported Bush or McCain but preferred Gore if the other was nominated. They could be hedging because they supported Gore all along but found either Bush or McCain highly objectionable and crossed over to support the other. They could also be raiding because they viewed one candidate as weaker and thus voted for him to increase Gore's chances. Whichever it is, they fall into one of the three crossover types.³⁶

The other two groups are those who voted for Bush or McCain but who intended to vote against their candidate in the general election. These two groups are much smaller than the first two, but they are more disturbing to those who support closed parties. Since these groups are not supporting their own candidate in the general election, they are by definition not sincere crossovers. They instead must be hedgers or raiders.

To see the relative size of these groups, I multiplied the percentage that would support Gore by the percentage of the subgroup within it that voted for either Bush or McCain, thus

³⁶ For these people to be crossovers by this paper's definition, they cannot be Rep-IDs. While the available data did not break down voters by both Party-ID and intended general election vote, I would argue that it is highly reasonable to assume that the bulk (although certainly not all) of people prepared to vote for Gore in a general election were not Rep-IDs. Thus for the sake of simplicity I am considering them all non-Rep-IDs and thereby crossovers. I will continue to make this assumption in comparable situations throughout the paper.

getting the overall percentage.³⁷ Overall, I found that the total sincere/hedgers/raiders groups varied from comprising somewhat over 10% to up to 34% of the overall vote. Since only eleven states were in the sample, a further breakdown by primary election system gives very limited data. The three closed states did come in lowest, varying from somewhat over 10% to up to 23%. The four semiclosed states ranged from 20% to 34%, and among the open states the range was 17% to 32%.

The additional totals of the two hedgers/raiders groups were always lower. They ranged from somewhat over 1% to up to 8%. Again, there was some but not overwhelming variation within the limited samples. Closed states were between somewhat over 1% to up to 5%. Semiclosed were somewhat over 1% to up to 8%, and open ranged from 3% to 7%. Clearly, these are only minimal differences in numbers that are quite small from the outset.

In short, one segment of voters were either sincere (but nonetheless would not support one of the two leading Republican candidates in the general election), hedgers, or raiders. They comprised, on average, about a quarter of the total vote. While in closed states they were somewhat fewer, this sample was far too small to conclude anything definitive regarding the influence of primary election systems. An additional segment was either hedgers or raiders and measured in the single digits. Again, their numbers fell a bit in closed states, but nothing definitive can be proven by it.

With respect to determining more specifically what these voters' intentions were, only educated guessing is possible. I would argue that the bulk of the sincere/hedger/raider group was simply Ind-IDs and Dem-IDs who liked McCain but would go back to Gore if Bush was

³⁷ For instance, in Ohio, 12% of voters intended to support Gore over McCain. Of those, 17% voted for McCain. I multiplied the two together ($.12 * .17 = .02$) to get the overall percentage. Thus 2% of all voters voted for McCain but intended to support Gore over him in the general election (thus putting them into one of the two hedgers/raiders groups). I recognize that this is not a precise measurement and that I am already dealing with rounded numbers. However, it at least gives a good flavor of how much crossover is occurring.

nominated. Thus they would be most sincere. In neither group would it make sense to think that raiders were dominant. Since neither Bush nor McCain at the time had a reputation as a significantly weaker general election nominee, people would not have been motivated to raid in large numbers. Some might have viewed one candidate as weaker in their own minds and raided based on that view, but I would conjecture that those instances were fairly rare. Thus I would argue that the larger group (about 25% of the total vote) were predominantly sincere and the smaller group (5% or so) were largely hedgers. Again, this is only thoughtful speculation.

Overview: The Impact of Primary Election Systems on the 2000 Republican Nomination

Overall, the election showed a deep division among those voting in the Republican primaries. In the seventeen primaries held before McCain suspended his campaign, Bush won among Rep-IDs in all of them except McCain's home state of Arizona. McCain meanwhile won Ind-IDs in every state but Georgia and won Dem-IDs in all nine states in which they formed a statistically significant sample. The election ultimately came down to whether Rep-IDs or non-Rep-IDs would turnout in greater numbers, and this became a hopeless question for McCain. Despite McCain's success in generating significant crossover, Rep-IDs still comprised majorities in fourteen of the states. Overall, the median and mean Rep-ID percentage was 63% (table 6). While this is remarkably low, it still was not enough to help McCain due to his minimal support among Rep-IDs. Bush won simply based on his momentum from large victories among Rep-IDs.

What role did primary election systems play in this? When the seventeen primaries are ranked by the number of Rep-IDs who voted in them (table 6), the five closed primary states are all on the top of the list, ranging from having Rep-IDs comprise 72% to 82% of their total vote. The nine open primaries, on the other hand, ranged from 48% to 69% with several states in the

low 60s, and semiclosed primaries were more split with two in the high 60s and the other two at a very low 37% and 40%. Thus the effect of open and semiclosed primaries varied from state to state: sometimes they remained mostly under the influence of Rep-IDs (as was the case in Ohio and Maryland), but other times they facilitated enormous outsider influence. These included three states (Michigan, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts) in which Rep-IDs actually became a minority in their own party.

Considering the fact that outsiders and insiders had distinctly different preferences in this election, these varying levels of openness clearly had some impact. It is critical to note that in all but two cases, all of McCain's states had lower Rep-ID percentages than Bush's. The two exceptions were McCain's home state of Arizona and Connecticut (discussed briefly above). To put it the opposite way, with just two exceptions every single Bush state had a lower non-Rep-ID percentage than every single McCain state. The question then becomes whether changing the primary election systems could have affected the final outcome.

Counterfactual Analysis

If All Primaries Had Been Closed: Had all the states been closed, it is almost certain that Bush would have won by even more. McCain would probably still have won New Hampshire (considering his victory there among Rep-Regs), but he would have almost certainly lost Michigan and would have gone on to March 7 to be defeated even more decisively than he did. McCain would likely have lost Rhode Island (since Bush won Rep-Regs there) and might have lost Massachusetts too. Considering Bush's narrow victory among Rep-IDs in Vermont, it also could have swung to Bush. Thus McCain might have been relegated to a victory in just Connecticut.

If All Primaries Had Been Open: However, had all primaries been open, the outcome would not necessarily have swung to McCain. It is important to remember that regardless of the openness of primaries, Rep-IDs still usually cast a majority of the vote. Bush still would have scored his significant early open primary victories in South Carolina and Virginia, and it is hard to imagine McCain surviving March 7 even with all primaries open. Based on the raw total vote, Bush still would have won California. McCain also failed to generate sufficient crossover in Georgia, Missouri, and Ohio despite the fact that they were already open, so Bush still would have won those three states. Completely opening up Maine's semiclosed primary might have helped McCain some, but it is difficult to conclude that it actually would have changed the outcome. Perhaps the only March 7 election that would have tipped was New York, where Bush won the closed primary by only 51%-43%. Still, even had McCain won New York, it is doubtful that that would have saved him. In short, it appears that no amount of primary openness could have reversed the fortunes of a candidate who had lost the support of his party's base as strongly as McCain had.

If All Primaries Had Been Semiclosed: Exit polling collected information based on registration in all five semiclosed states as well as New Hampshire. In all five, Bush did at least somewhat better among Rep-IDs than Rep-Regs, showing that—just like in closed primary states—those two groups are not synonymous. Still, Bush won among Rep-Regs in four of the five states (New Hampshire being the exception). As discussed above, in Rhode Island and perhaps Massachusetts, Bush won Rep-Regs while losing the overall vote. Thus Ind-Regs were clearly a negative for Bush. Nevertheless, considering my argument above that Bush would have

won if all states were open, it seems unlikely that a scenario of all states being semiclosed would have produced a fundamentally different outcome.

Summary

In short, the lessons from the 2000 Republican presidential primary can be summarized in the following points:

1. The most important step to winning the nomination was gaining the strong support of Rep-IDs. Bush's ability to do so by a decisive margin ultimately overwhelmed McCain's efforts to generate crossover. The lesson to be learned is that it is very difficult for any primary election system to trump the will of a unified Party-ID base.
2. Having said that, crossover voting was sizable. At no time did fewer than 18% of the vote come from non-Rep-IDs. Overall, the median and mean non-Rep-ID percentage was a significant 37%. Three states actually saw non-Rep-IDs comprise a majority of the voters.
3. Primary election systems did have a noticeable impact on the Rep-ID percentage. At no time in closed states did it drop below 72%. However, in an open state, the Rep-ID percentage never exceeded 69% and sometimes dropped as low as 48%. Interestingly, semiclosed states saw even lower numbers, ranging from a high of 69% to a low of 37%.
4. Thus the primary election system did have a significant impact on particular states. Had all states been closed, Bush would probably have won at least a couple more primaries, and if all had been open, McCain might have picked up one or two more states. While almost nothing could have reversed this election's result, this does indicate that in a race in which Party-IDs are more divided, primary election systems could be a determining factor.
5. Data was limited on types of crossover voting. However, on Super Tuesday it does appear that a sizable segment of the vote was coming from not-fully-committed voters. About 25% on average came from people who were either hedgers, raiders, or were sincere but unwilling to support one of the two lead

Republicans in the general election. My estimate is that most fell into the latter category. An additional segment of about 5% was either hedgers or raiders, and by my assessment, most were hedgers. The data was too limited to determine whether primary election systems affected the crossover type.

CASE STUDY 2: THE 2000 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

As Bush was emerging as the Republican choice, Democrats were also selecting their nominee. From the start, Vice President Al Gore had been the frontrunner to be the heir of the Clinton presidency. Only former New Jersey Sen. Bill Bradley stepped forward to oppose him, challenging him from the left as an independently-minded and reform oriented candidate. Gore won the first major contest in the race, overwhelming Bradley in the January 24 Iowa Caucuses 63%-35%. The contest then turned to the critical New Hampshire Primary, where Gore and Bradley were in a more closely-matched fight.

February 1: New Hampshire

Bradley was able to use his outsider appeal to generate some dividends in this semiclosed state (table 7). Bradley won Ind-IDs (who comprised a significant 40% of the total vote) 56%-41%. However, Gore carried Dem-IDs (56% of the vote) by a solid 59%-41%, allowing him to sneak past Bradley to a narrow 50%-46% overall victory and thus to deny Bradley a key chance to gain momentum. Dem-Regs comprised 65% of the total, and they supported Gore 55%-43%. Bradley meanwhile won Ind-Regs (30% of the total) 59%-39% and carried those who had not previously registered (5%) 53%-46%. In short, Gore won a key victory, but only by a narrow margin that was not enough to derail Bradley. It also showed the emergence of a division similar

to the one on the Republican side: one candidate was gaining the support of Party-IDs while the other won among Ind-IDs.³⁸

February 5: Delaware

Although Republicans had many contests between New Hampshire and the March 7 Super Tuesday primaries, the Democrats essentially had a five-week gap in between. The only contests were non-binding primaries in Delaware on February 5 and Washington on February 29. VNS did conduct exit polling in Delaware, so that data can be added into this paper's analysis.

The Delaware Primary was closed, and the Dem-ID percentage was a solid 75% (table 7). Gore won Dem-IDs 60%-37%, and even won among the 23% who were Ind-IDs 51%-45% for an overall victory of 57%-40%. Although Delaware was not the focus of either campaign, these numbers, coupled with Gore's overwhelming 68%-31% victory in Washington (where VNS did not conduct exit polling) a few weeks later showed that Bradley's support was fading as he headed into Super Tuesday.

March 7: Super Tuesday

Overview: Gore swept the nation on March 7, carrying all eleven primaries in California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont. He also won caucuses in Hawaii, Idaho, North Dakota, and Washington. Bradley immediately fell out, essentially assuring Gore's nomination.

³⁸ Like on the Republican side, voters were also asked whether they had considered voting in the other party's primary and whether they would consider voting for the Reform Party. Again, because these questions only regard the voter's prior consideration and not actual intention, I am choosing not to analyze them in this paper.

How Party-IDs Voted: Gore won Dem-IDs in all eleven primaries and never did so with less than 60% support (table 8). In six states he received more than 70%, and in Georgia (Gore's best state), he beat Bradley among Dem-IDs by an overwhelming 88%-12%. By winning so strongly among the party's base, Gore guaranteed himself a landslide victory. This was even despite the fact that Bradley actually won Ind-IDs in seven states. However, Bradley's Ind-ID margins never matched Gore's overwhelming Dem-ID support, and his best showing was garnering 55% of the Ind-ID vote in Rhode Island.

Overall, Party-IDs cast larger shares of the vote than on the Republican side. The Dem-ID percentage never sank below 58%. In seven states, Dem-IDs cast over 70% of the vote, and in four states they were over 80%. Like in the Republican contests, the closed primaries tended to see a higher Party-ID percentage. In the four closed primaries, the number ranged from 77% and 85%. Semiclosed states were distinctly lower, ranging from 60% to 69%. Interestingly, open primaries were more mixed. In Georgia's open primary, the Dem-ID percentage was a solid 81%. Missouri and Ohio were at 78% and 77% respectively while Vermont came in significantly lower at 58%.

How Party-Regs Voted: VNS collected information based on party registration in the three semiclosed states (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island). Gore won Dem-Regs each time, never with less than 56% support. Bradley won Ind-Regs in Rhode Island 56%-43% but lost them in Massachusetts 45%-53%. Maine did not produce a statistically significant sample. Of the three states, none saw Ind-Regs cast a very significant portion of the vote. The Dem-Reg percentage was lowest in Rhode Island at 73%. It was 76% in Massachusetts and went to a high

of 90% in Maine. Thus, like Ind-IDs, Ind-Regs did not cast a large enough portion of the vote to have any determinative impact.

Impact that the Republican Primaries Had on Crossover: Why were Party-ID percentages lower on the Republican side than on the Democratic side? The reason appears to be McCain, who was (as discussed above) a reform-oriented candidate like Bradley making his last stand that night by garnering significant Ind-ID support in the Republican contest. To determine the extent to which McCain was able to draw Ind-IDs onto the Republican side (thus depleting them in the Democratic primaries), I compared the percent of each party's vote coming from Ind-IDs in open and semiclosed states (and, in semiclosed states, from Ind-Regs) (table 9).³⁹ To compensate for the fact that a (sometimes very) unequal number of people voted in each party's primary, I took the Ind-ID and Ind-Reg percentage in each party (columns A and B) and multiplied them by the total number of votes cast in each (columns D and E). The result is the number of Ind-IDs and Ind-Regs who voted in each party's primary rounded to the appropriate two (and in one case one) significant figures (columns F and G).

The results show that in every open and semiclosed primary, more Ind-IDs and Ind-Regs voted in the Republican primary than in the Democratic primary.⁴⁰ In all four open states, Ind-IDs broke into the Republican primary by a greater than three to two margin, and in two states (Georgia and Missouri) it was by a greater than three to one margin. In the three semiclosed primary states, Ind-IDs broke in Maine and Massachusetts by about three to two. Only in Rhode

³⁹ Since Maryland was closed on the Democratic side and semiclosed on the Republican side, I excluded it from the analysis.

⁴⁰ Of course in the three semiclosed states, not all Ind-IDs had a choice. Those who were also Party-Regs had to vote in their party's primary. This analysis cannot determine how many Ind-IDs were Party-Regs and how many were Ind-Regs. Nevertheless, the fact that in these three states less than 100% of Ind-IDs had free choice does not cast in doubt that overall Ind-IDs lopsidedly chose to participate in Republican primaries.

Island were the numbers particularly close with only a slightly larger number voting Republican. Among Ind-Regs, in all three states they broke by about two to one into the Republican primary. This major swing towards the Republicans almost certainly hurt Bradley since it was depleting the closest thing that he had to a base on the Democratic side. The lesson to be learned from this is that outsider candidates running in open and semiclosed primaries have to compete against not only candidates in their own party but also fellow outsider candidates in the other party. A candidate who is trying to generate crossover will be hampered if a similar effort is occurring on the other side.

Other Breakdowns: VNS also asked voters whether they had participated in a Democratic primary before. Overall, those who had voted before made up the overwhelming majority of voters. Missouri was lowest at a still high 77%, and in five states the number was at or exceeded 90%. Gore won among them in every state. In four states, new Democratic primary voters did not even comprise a statistically significant sample. In the other seven, Bradley did somewhat better among new voters than previous voters in five states and stayed even in a sixth. He actually won new voters in Vermont, but overall they never differed significantly from the overall vote.

California Results: As in the Republican Primary, California tabulated results in the blanket primary by Party-Reg and only the votes of Dem-Regs actually counted. The numbers generally reflected the results of the exit polling: Gore was the overwhelming favorite of Dem-Regs but did somewhat worse among non-Dem-Regs although here he still won them (table 10). Gore swept Dem-Regs (who comprised 81% of the total) 81%-18% and won every other group

by lesser margins. Gore carried Ind-Regs (10% of the total) 75%-25% and Rep-Regs (7%) 73%-27%. He did worst among Greens, whom he still won 62%-38%. Overall, Gore won 80%-20%. Like elsewhere, Party-Regs made up a larger portion of the vote in the Democratic Primary than in the Republican Primary.

Data on Types of Crossover: As with the Republican side, VNS asked voters how they would vote in a match up between Gore and Bush and Gore and McCain. This should give some information on the crossover types occurring. Unfortunately, they did not ask about voter preference if Bradley was in the general election (presumably in anticipation of Bradley's imminent defeat). This greatly inhibits any possible analysis.

Overall, between 2% and 13% of Democratic primary voters said that they intended to support Bush over Gore in the general election. In all states where this group formed a statistically significant sample, Bradley won every time, getting between 55% and 77%. McCain did much better than Bush, receiving between 7% and 30% support. Of these, Bradley also won each time that there was a statistically significant sample with between 57% and 71%.

To do this analysis, like for the Republican primaries, I separated people into four groups. I then found each group's overall percentage of the vote.⁴¹ However, because there were no general election match-ups with Bradley, the data was much messier (table 11). Those who voted for Bradley but would support McCain over Gore were one group. The second was Bradley voters who would support Bush over Gore. These two groups were comprised of sincere/hedgers/raiders, but each group potentially (and likely did) overlap. Thus when adding

⁴¹ See note 37.

the two groups, I could only give a range for a possible total. The size of the larger group was the minimum possible total, and the sum of the two groups was the maximum possible total.⁴²

The other two groups were those who voted for Gore but (for one group) would support McCain over Gore and (for the other) would support Bush over Gore. These groups were hedgers/raiders. Like the first two groups, these also could not be added together because they might overlap. Thus I had to give a range for their possible total too following the same procedure. It is important to note that neither the sincere/hedgers/raiders group nor the hedgers/raiders group represent the total groups of such voters since additional voters would have bolted had Bradley been nominated, and without general election match ups with Bradley it is impossible to know how many these are. Thus the totals in table 11 do not include other comparable groups of voters that this data could not detect.

What I found was that the sincere/hedgers/raiders group's range usually fell somewhere between 15% and 25%. The hedgers/raiders group's range was usually between 5% and 10%. In short, a group of the overall vote (usually somewhere around one fifth) can be identified that has to be made up of sincere crossovers who were unwilling to support one Democratic candidate in the general election, hedgers, and raiders. An additional group (with a percentage in the mid-single digits) can be identified as being made of just hedgers and raiders. In both cases, (due to unavailable data) there could be additional groups that have the same makeup. Obviously, these are fairly vague findings, and breaking the information down further by primary election system is futile.

⁴² For instance, in New York, 14% of all voters voted for Bradley but intended to support McCain over Gore in the general election. Also, 5% voted for Bradley but said that they would support Bush over Gore. These two groups are not necessarily separate and could overlap. Thus I gave a range for the total. The minimum would be if the smaller group completely overlapped with the larger group, so I gave the larger group as the smallest possible total (14%). The maximum would be if the groups did not overlap at all, so I gave the sum of the two groups as the largest possible total (19%). Thus the range in which the total could fall was 14%-19%.

As for a more specific analysis of the voter intentions in these two groups, I would stick with my analysis of the Republican primaries. Since neither Gore nor Bradley were clearly weak potential nominees, it seems unlikely that most were raiders. In the first group, it seems likely that most liked Bradley but were not willing to support Gore if he was nominated. Thus I would conjecture that most in the sincere/hedgers/raiders group were sincere but unwilling to stay with one of the two Democrats. Likewise, most in the hedgers/raiders group were hedgers.

Overview: The Impact of Primary Election Systems on the 2000 Democratic Nomination

Ultimately, Gore's overwhelming victory limits analysis of the impact that primary election systems had on this election. His ability to unify Dem-ID support suffocated Bradley's chances, and Bradley's notably better showing among Ind-IDs was not enough to counter Gore's support. Thus the most that can be done with this data is to see whether primary election systems significantly impacted Dem-ID participation and impacted the degree to which Gore won in given states.

VNS conducted exit polling in thirteen states on or before Super Tuesday (five closed, three semiclosed, and four open). However, when the states are ranked by Dem-ID percentage, there is only a moderate correlation between the Dem-ID percentage and the primary election system (table 12). Closed primaries did have high Dem-ID percentages, never dropping below 75% and going as high as 85%. However, three of the four open primaries also fell within this range with only one (Vermont) dropping below at 58%. Semiclosed primaries, interestingly, did have noticeably lower Dem-ID percentages. They saw a high of 69% and a low of 56%. Semiclosed primaries' Dem-Reg percentages were somewhat higher at 90%, 76%, 73%, and 65%.

However, as discussed above, the reason for there not being more difference between closed primaries and open/semiclosed primaries could be the large numbers of Ind-IDs going into the Republican primaries to back McCain. Overall, the median Party-ID percentage was 77% and the mean was 73%. This is considerably higher than the Republicans' 63% and 63%. Thus the failure of open and semiclosed primaries to lower Dem-ID percentages even more might not be the cause of an inherent failure as much as Bradley's failure to capitalize on their openness.

However, when comparing primary election systems, the Dem-ID percentage, and Gore's own percentage, the correlation gets a bit stronger. States with the lowest Dem-ID percentages were more accessible and Gore did not do as well in them: of the five states that saw the Dem-ID percentage dip below 70%, none were closed and four were among Gore's worst five showings. Likewise, among the four states with Dem-IDs at 80% or above, three were closed and three were among Gore's top five showings. However, there were significant exceptions. Gore's best showing of all was garnering 84% of the vote in Georgia, even though it was open and the Dem-ID percentage was the second highest of any state. Likewise, Connecticut—despite being closed—was Gore's third worst showing. In short, there was a general relationship between the strength of Gore's showing, the Dem-ID percentage, and the primary election system used, but there were also some exceptions.

Counterfactual Analysis

If All Primaries Had Been Closed: The existence of only closed primaries would have exaggerated Gore's victory even farther. A more solid 55%-43% victory in New Hampshire

(which is what Gore won among Dem-Regs) might have forced Bradley to fall out immediately. Even if it had not, Gore would have won an even more lopsided landslide on Super Tuesday.

If All Primaries Had Been Open: The biggest impact that this could have had would have been in New Hampshire. If an open primary had enabled Bradley to beat Gore, the story of the campaign would have changed. However, considering that the race was already semiclosed, it is by no means certain that an open primary would have produced a significantly different result. Had Bradley still lost New Hampshire, he would also still have been crushed on Super Tuesday. He would probably have narrowed his margin of loss in some states (and there is the slightest chance that he could have won Connecticut), but ultimately no amount of opening could have reversed his overwhelming defeat. Even if Bradley had won New Hampshire, it still seems at least improbable that Bradley could have overcome his disadvantage among Dem-IDs.

If All Primaries Had Been Semiclosed: Like under the last scenario, Gore's victory was very likely no matter what the primary election system. New Hampshire, already semiclosed, would not have been affected. As before, there is a minute possibility that Bradley could have won Connecticut, but Super Tuesday still would have remained a landslide.

Summary

Despite the lack of competitiveness in the race and the inhibitions that it places on analysis, the following points can be learned from the 2000 Democratic primaries:

1. As seen on the Republican side, uniting Party-IDs is a trump card to winning a nomination. Gore's ability to win Dem-IDs in every state with never less than 59% support sealed his victory.

2. This is even truer when crossover is light. Dem-IDs never consisted of less than 56% of the overall vote and in eight of thirteen states were at or exceeded 75%. Their median percentage was 77% with a mean of 73%.
3. Different primary election systems produced somewhat but not overwhelmingly different Dem-ID percentages. Among closed primaries, the number ranged from 75% and 85%. Open primaries, however, were not significantly lower: three fell within the closed primary's range while a fourth was at 58%. Semiclosed primaries were lowest, ranging between 56% and 69%.
4. However, these muddled results were at least partially caused by large numbers of Ind-IDs and Ind-Regs who were choosing to vote in Republican primaries instead. Often they voted in Republican primaries more than Democratic primaries by a three-to-two margin and sometimes by more than a two-to-one margin. This limited the impact of open and semiclosed primaries and caused them to function more like closed primaries. The lesson to be learned from this is that if candidates in both parties (in this case McCain and Bradley) are appealing to outsiders, one candidate can potentially win a much larger share, reduce the crossover into the other party, and thereby cause Part-IDs on the other side to have a greater influence in their own primary.
5. Because of this drying up of crossover support for Bradley and (more importantly) Gore's strong support among Dem-IDs, it is highly doubtful that any change in primary election systems could have prevented Gore's victory.
6. From the limited and incomplete data, it is clear that in the Super Tuesday primaries, a group of at least 5%-10% were hedgers or raiders and were more likely hedgers. Another group of at least 15%-25% could have been any type of crossover but were most likely sincere crossovers who did not intend to support the other Democratic candidate in the general election.

CASE STUDY 3: THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

With President Bush facing no challenge for renomination, all attention was on the Democratic race. Former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean emerged during 2003 as a surprise frontrunner, rallying liberals as a charismatic opponent of the war in Iraq and other Bush Administration policies. However, in the first major contest in the race—the January 17 Iowa Caucuses—the lead unexpectedly changed. Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry, a reliable liberal and long-serving legislator, won with 38%. North Carolina Sen. John Edwards, a young and telegenic former trial lawyer promoting a populist message, scored a respectable second with 32%. Dean came in a very disappointing third place at 18%, and Missouri Rep. Dick Gephardt, a labor-backed candidate who had won Iowa in his 1988 campaign, received a devastatingly low 11% and fell out. Ohio Rep. Dennis Kucinich, a very liberal and strongly anti-war candidate, received 1%. Three other candidates skipped the contest: retired Gen. Wesley Clark, a newcomer to electoral politics and a late entrant into the race; Connecticut Sen. Joe Lieberman, who was promoting himself as the most hawkish candidate; and the Rev. Al Sharpton, a very liberal African-American civil rights activist. The race then moved to New Hampshire.

Unfortunately, Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International asked fewer questions in 2004 that pertain to this paper than VNS did in 2000. While they still asked about Party-ID, they did not ask about preference for an open or closed primary, only rarely asked about prior participation in Democratic primaries, and usually did not even collect information on Party-Reg. Most importantly, they did not collect data based on voter preference in general election matchups. Without this, analysis of crossover type is very difficult.

February 1: New Hampshire

Propelled by his Iowa victory, Kerry won the semiclosed New Hampshire primary, defeating Dean 38%-26% (table 13). Clark and Edwards each garnered 12%, and Lieberman trailed with 9%. Kucinich received 1%, and Sharpton did not actively compete. Ind-IDs cast a significant 48% of the vote. However, their vote closed mirrored the overall total: Kerry beat Dean among them 37%-23%. Dem-IDs (also comprising 48% of the total) likewise supported Kerry over Dean, 41%-29%. The only candidate to do significantly differently between Dem-IDs and Ind-IDs was Lieberman, who received 5% Dem-ID support but 12% Ind-ID support. However, Rep-IDs (just 4% of the total) cast a significantly different vote. Kerry still won them with 29%, but Lieberman—arguably the most moderate candidate—came in a strong second with 26%. Clark received 10%, and everyone else finished in the single digits.

In addition, Party-Reg data closed mirrored Party-ID data. Dem-Regs and Ind-Regs each comprised 45% of the total vote. Kerry won Dem-Regs 40%-30% and Ind-Regs 36%-25%, beating Dean both times. Clark went from 9% support among Dem-Regs to 12% among Ind-Regs, and Lieberman again did better among outsiders, going from 7% to 11%. No one else's numbers differed significantly between the two groups.

In short, Ind-IDs and Ind-Regs voted in very high numbers, preventing the Dem-IDs and Dem-Regs from constituting a majority in their own primary. However, the outsiders did something that they had not done in 2000: they essentially voted the same way as the insiders. Had Ind-IDs and Ind-Regs been united around one candidate, they would have had a significant impact on the outcome. As it was, all groups supported Kerry, and thus the high numbers of outsiders casting ballots did not have any impact on the result. With this second victory in hand,

Kerry moved on to a collection of five primaries and two caucuses being held simultaneously the next week. The other candidates hoped to check his momentum.

February 3: Arizona, Delaware, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina

Overview: Kerry came out the clear victor again on February 3 (table 14). Of the five primaries, Kerry won three, carrying Arizona by a 17%-margin over Clark; Delaware by a 39%-margin over Lieberman; and Missouri by a 26%-margin over Edwards. Kerry also won caucuses in New Mexico and North Dakota. Edwards and Clark, meanwhile, did the best of the other candidates and each won one primary. Edwards defeated Kerry 45%-30% in South Carolina, and Clark narrowly edged Edwards in Oklahoma for a 29.9%-29.5% victory with Kerry coming in a close third at 27%. Dean, whose former frontrunner status was now completely shattered, largely skipped these contests to focus on later races and was only able to score between 4% and 14%. Kucinich and Sharpton both did quite poorly but would continue in the race for the remainder of the contested campaign. Lieberman, only garnering between 2% and 11%, fell out.

How Party-IDs Voted: Overall, Dem-IDs cast the bulk of the votes in all states although it was higher in closed primaries. In the three closed states (Arizona, Delaware, and Oklahoma), Ind-ID participation ranged from 11% to 16%. In the two open states (Missouri and South Carolina), it rose to 23% and 24%, respectively. As in New Hampshire, Ind-ID preferences were not different enough from Dem-ID preferences to have a major impact. In four of the five states, the overall winner also won among both Dem-IDs and Ind-IDs. The only exception was in the close contest in Oklahoma where Clark narrowly carried Dem-IDs for an overall win while Edwards narrowly won Ind-IDs.

Nevertheless, at a candidate-by-candidate level, some differences in Ind-ID and Dem-ID preference were apparent. Kerry did at least 10% better among Dem-IDs than Ind-IDs in each state. However, in four of five states Edwards did at least somewhat better among Ind-IDs, and Lieberman's support was distinctly stronger among Ind-IDs in every state. Interestingly, despite being philosophically on the opposite side of the candidate pool from Lieberman, Kucinich also did notably better among Ind-IDs. Neither Clark, Dean, nor Sharpton were significantly stronger in either group.

Among Rep-IDs (who comprised statistically significant samples in three states but never exceeded 6% of the total), Edwards won each time. Kerry did significantly worse each time, and Clark did at least somewhat worse in all three states. The greatest gains among Rep-IDs were by Lieberman, who scored significantly better in each state and almost actually won Rep-IDs in Oklahoma. None of the other candidates' showings differed significantly among Rep-IDs.

Data on Types of Crossover: Since Rep-IDs were not aligned with the Democratic Party, some may have had motivations to hedge or raid. However, it is almost impossible to construe their intent. Perhaps some were raiding in that they thought that Edwards and Lieberman would be somewhat weaker nominees than Kerry but had a much better chance of actually defeating Kerry than the truly weak Dean, Kucinich, and Sharpton. Perhaps they were hedging, thinking that Edwards and Lieberman would be more palatable nominees. Even so, what can be made of the portion who voted for Kerry? Perhaps most of these Rep-IDs were sincere and truly supported the candidate from who they voted. Without more data, all of this is speculation, and, regardless, Rep-IDs made up only a small portion of the overall vote.

February 10: Tennessee and Virginia

Kerry continued gaining steam with wins in the February 7 Washington Caucuses and Michigan party-run primary (where no exit polling was conducted) and the February 8 Maine Caucuses. Edwards and Clark hoped to halt Kerry in their home southern turf in the open Tennessee and Virginia Primaries on February 10.⁴³ However, Kerry's momentum overwhelmed them yet again (table 15). Kerry won Tennessee with 41% of the vote to Edwards's 27% and Clark's 23%. In Virginia, Kerry dominated by even more, beating Edwards 52%-27% with Clark coming in a distant third at 9%. Clark, seeing the writing on the wall from his double third-place showing, abandoned the race. Dean, who was focusing on a last-stand effort in Wisconsin the next week, only scored in the single digits.

As on February 3, Dem-IDs comprised the large majority of the vote even though both primaries were open. The Dem-ID percentage was 75% in Tennessee and 73% in Virginia. Dem-IDs strongly supported Kerry in both states, backing him over Edwards 46%-25% in Tennessee and 57%-23% in Virginia. Among Ind-IDs, Edwards did better, but it was not nearly enough to reverse the result. In Tennessee Edwards defeated Kerry among Ind-IDs by a narrow 32%-31%, but Kerry still won Ind-IDs in Virginia, defeating Edwards 41%-32%. Edwards was beginning to cement stronger support among Ind-IDs than Dem-IDs but not by enough for it matter. Clark also did somewhat better among Ind-IDs but still trailed. Among Rep-IDs (who comprised 5% of the total in both states), Kerry did significantly worse. Edwards did much better among them and won them with 48% support in Virginia. Clark did somewhat better among them in both states and was actually able to win them narrowly in Tennessee. As discussed above, although some of these Rep-IDs could have been hedgers or raiders, it is impossible to know for sure.

⁴³ Tennessee's primary is open, but according to CNN, "the voter must 'declare' a party, according to state election officials, although they can later reverse their declaration." For more see, <<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/special/president/primary.explainer/frameset.exclude.html>>.

February 17: Wisconsin

Kerry was emerging as the prohibitive favorite in the race. After February 14 caucus victories in the District of Columbia and Nevada, Kerry moved on to Wisconsin's open primary. The results, however, were somewhat surprising (table 15). Kerry defeated Edwards by an unusually narrow 40%-34%. Edwards, claiming that the tide of the race was turning, proclaimed that night, "Today, the voters of Wisconsin sent a clear message. The message is this—objects in your mirror may be closer than they appear."⁴⁴ Dean's third place showing at 18% marked the end of his campaign, and he quickly fell out.

Much of Edwards' success stemmed from the comparatively low Dem-ID vote. Dem-IDs made up 69% (which, while still high, was the lowest level since New Hampshire) and supported Kerry by a decisive 48%-31%. However, Edwards won among Ind-IDs (29%) 40%-28% and among Rep-ID (who comprised a remarkable 9% of the total) with 44% to Kerry's 18%. With the field narrowing to a two-man race, the campaign was shifting somewhat towards the shape that it had taken in 2000: the frontrunner was the clear favorite of Party-IDs while the main opponent was doing comparatively better among Ind-IDs.

Finally, it should be noted that Dean's showing was the only part of the result that may shed any light on crossover type. He won only 16% among Dem-IDs and did somewhat better among Ind-IDs with 21%. However, despite his quite liberal policies, his best showing was among Rep-IDs with 26%. It seems unlikely that Rep-IDs were crossing over sincerely or hedging by voting for Dean. Thus a sizable portion of his Rep-ID support might have come from

⁴⁴ CNN NewsNight, "Kerry Wins Wisconsin; Edwards Close Second," 18 February, 2004, CNN, online, available: <[http:// transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0402/17/asb.00.html](http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0402/17/asb.00.html)>, 25 November, 2005.

raiders. Nevertheless, the number of Rep-IDs who voted for Dean was only about 2% of the total vote, so if raiding were occurring for Dean, it was a very small phenomenon.

March 2: Super Tuesday

Overview: With the race narrowed to a Kerry-Edwards contest and with Kerry the clear frontrunner, the campaign moved on. Despite Edwards's hopes that Wisconsin marked the beginning of a reversal of fortune, Kerry continued to roll up easy victories in the February 24 Hawaii and Idaho Caucuses and the Utah Primary (where there was no exit polling). The campaign finally ended on Super Tuesday when nine primaries and one caucus were held. Kerry swept primaries in California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Rhode Island as well as the Minnesota Caucuses. The only anomaly was in Dean's home state of Vermont, where Edwards was not on the ballot and the voters supported their favorite son even though he had already dropped out. Knowing that ultimate defeat was inevitable, Edwards quit the race, ensuring Kerry's nomination.

How Party-IDs Voted: Except for Vermont, Kerry won Dem-IDs in every state with at least 56% support, and in five states his support exceeded 65% (table 16). As in 2000, such overwhelming support among Party-IDs virtually guaranteed eventual victory. Among Ind-IDs, results were closer but not radically different. While Kerry did notably worse among Ind-ID than Dem-IDs in every state, he still won Ind-IDs in six states. In his best state for Ind-ID support (Rhode Island), Kerry in fact defeated Edwards among Ind-IDs by a decisive 59%-26%. Edwards's only victories among Ind-IDs were 51%-32% in Georgia and a narrow 42%-39% in Ohio. Kucinich continued to do much better among Ind-IDs than Dem-IDs (in all but one state

doing at least twice as well). In the four states where Rep-IDs were statistically significant, Edwards won them in three. Kerry, however, was able to pull off a Rep-ID victory in California.

The Dem-ID percentage continued to be high, but it varied notably based on primary election system. The three closed primaries had the highest Dem-ID percentages, all falling between 82% and 84%. The three semiclosed states were between 61% and 75%. Among the three open states, one was at 52% and others were in the low 70s. Rep-IDs only went above 4% once: in the open Georgia Primary, they reached a high of 10%.

California Results: As in 2000, California conducted a precise tabulation based on Party-Reg. However, it had since switched from a blanket primary to a semiclosed primary, so only Dem-Regs and Ind-Regs could participate (although Republicans continued a closed primary).⁴⁵ The results reaffirm the general trends recorded in the exit polling (table 17). Kerry did very well among Dem-Regs (who comprised 93% of the total), carrying them 65%-20%. Kerry also won Ind-Regs (the remaining 7%), but by a somewhat less significant 56%-22%. Overall, Kerry won 64%-20%. Kucinich did much better among Ind-Regs than Dem-Regs, garnering 9% and 4% respectively for an overall showing of 5%.

Overview: The Impact of Primary Election Systems on the 2004 Democratic Nomination

Due to the large number of candidates who remained in the contest through many primaries, this was a much more complex race than either one in 2000. However, by the end Kerry was the overwhelming victor. In the eighteen primaries analyzed in this paper, Kerry won fifteen. Clark, Dean, and Edwards each were victorious in one. In every case, the overall winner

⁴⁵ California Department of State, "Decline to State - Voter Information," online, available: <http://ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_decline.htm>, 29 November, 2005.

was also the winner among Dem-IDs, showing that at no time did Dem-IDs lose control of the process. However, not only was Kerry the favorite among Dem-IDs, but he also enjoyed significant (although not quite so overwhelming) support among Ind-IDs, winning them in eleven states. Edwards (doing notably better among them than among Dem-IDs) won them in six, and Dean in one.

The lesson from this campaign is that Party-IDs and Ind-ID do not always hold polarized positions (as they did in the Bush-McCain race and to a somewhat lesser extent in the Gore-Bradley race). They sometimes will both support the same candidate. When this happens, the openness of primary elections becomes less relevant since an open primary only has impact when it brings in voters with different preferences. With that said, though, Lieberman and Kucinich represent good examples of the opposite case. Despite the fact that neither received many votes, both did significantly better among Ind-IDs. Had either man run a viable campaign, Ind-IDs could have played a much more decisive role. What is also striking about this is how different Lieberman and Kucinich's beliefs were. What can be taken from that is that Ind-IDs are not a homogenous group and will cross over for different and even conflicting reasons.

What role did primary election systems have? When the Dem-ID percentages are separated by primary election system, the results conform more closely to what one might expect than they did in the Gore-Bradley race. Of the eighteen states, there were six closed, four semiclosed, and eight open primaries. When they are ranked by the Dem-ID percentage, all six closed primaries are on top closely bunched in the 82% to 84% range (table 18). Open and semiclosed primaries were both distinctly lower but overlapped tremendously, with open primaries ranging from 52% to 75% and semiclosed from 48% to 75%. Thus open and semiclosed primaries differed enough from closed primaries that had a candidate been able to

garner strong Ind-ID support, the primary election systems could have had a greater impact. As it was, that potential was unutilized.

Regardless of the differences by primary election system, overall the Dem-ID percentage was high with a median of 73% and a mean of 72%. This was about 10% higher than the 2000 Republican numbers and about the same as the 2000 Democratic numbers. However, it appears that the Democratic numbers stayed the same from 2000 to 2004 not because Ind-IDs voted in equal numbers but because the overall turnout was higher. I compared the number of Ind-IDs voting in all eleven states that had Democratic primaries in both 2000 and 2004 and that were analyzed in this paper (table 19).⁴⁶ I took the total number of votes cast (columns A and C) and multiplied them by the Ind-ID percentage (columns B and D). In all four open states, the actual number of Ind-IDs went up significantly and in fact more than doubled in Georgia and Missouri. In semiclosed states, the numbers went up by somewhat less in two states and went down in a third. However, in three of the four closed states, the number went down. The only exception was Delaware which was significantly more contested in 2004 than in 2000. Also, in every open and semiclosed state, the Ind-ID percentage rose slightly in 2004. However, it fell slightly in all four closed states. Thus it appears that open and semiclosed primaries were successful in bringing in more Ind-IDs in 2004 (when they did not have a McCain to compete against). However, (probably because of differences in overall turnout, in the specific sampled states, and in the prevalence of different primary election systems) that did not translate into a change in the median and mean Dem-ID percentage overall.

⁴⁶ I excluded California because I am counting it as closed in 2000 and semiclosed in 2004.

Counterfactual Analysis

If All Primaries Had Been Closed: Considering Kerry's stronger support among Dem-IDs than Ind-IDs, Kerry would have done even better in the February 3 and 10 primaries, perhaps causing his opponents to fall out quicker. A closed Wisconsin primary at best would not have given Edwards a false sense of optimism and at worst would have caused him to drop out (if he had not already done so). Ultimately, however, closing the primaries would only have hastened the result that was coming regardless: Kerry's landslide victory.

If All Primaries Had Been Open: Since opening the primaries would likely have (on the whole) only brought in more Kerry supporters, the results would not have been very different. An open Oklahoma Primary could have switched from Clark to Edwards which might have forced Clark out of the race quicker and given Edwards more momentum. Had this translated into a victory for Edwards in Tennessee, he might have been able to go from there to win Wisconsin. This would likely have given him broader appeal and support going into Super Tuesday. However, this is just speculation built on speculation. Ultimately, Edwards would have needed to build up much stronger Ind-ID support for there to be any likelihood that opening the primaries would have reversed the result.

If All Primaries Had Been Semiclosed: Considering how closely overlapped Dem-ID percentages were in both open and semiclosed primaries, very similar conclusions apply to both. Semiclosed primaries might have cut down on Rep-IDs crossing over in originally open states, which would have hurt Edwards a bit. However, the impact of this would only have been minimal.

Summary

Even though the 2004 Democratic results were very lopsided in favor of Kerry, the following lessons can be learned:

1. As in 2000, winning Party-IDs is critical to capturing the nomination. Kerry did so in fifteen of eighteen primaries and often by significant margins. This was enough to give him the nomination.
2. Overall, crossover was not significant. The median Dem-ID percentage was 73% and the mean was 72%—about 10% higher than the Republicans saw in 2000 and about the same as the 2000 Democratic numbers. However, in actual numbers, open and semiclosed states saw a significant rise in Ind-IDs from 2000. Those closed states where data was available saw a decrease.
3. Different primary election systems produced differing Dem-ID percentages. Dem-IDs were between 82% and 84% in closed primaries. Open and semiclosed primaries were both lower but saw very similar numbers to each other. The Dem-ID percentage was between 48% and 75% in semiclosed states and 52% to 75% in open states.
4. Kerry's support among both Dem-IDs and Ind-IDs makes it unlikely that any change in the primary election systems would have altered the results.
5. However, Lieberman and Kucinich show that candidates can get sizably more support among Ind-IDs than Dem-IDs. Had their campaigns been stronger, primary election systems could have been more determinative. These two men also show that Ind-IDs are not homogenous and can support very different candidates.
6. The data gave only very scattered evidence for what types of crossover were occurring. Rep-IDs cast as much as 10% of the vote, but the lack of information on general election match ups prevented any real analysis of the amount of hedging and raiding that occurred.

CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS

Summary of Findings

What light do these races shed on the three basic questions that I raised at the end of Chapter 2? Through the lens of all three case studies' findings, I will attempt to answer each in turn.

Do Primary Election Systems Affect the Winner? The bottom line is that the primary election systems were not determinative in selecting any of these three nominees. Bush, Gore, and Kerry would almost certainly have won under any combination of closed, semiclosed, and open primaries. However, none of these three contests were particularly close, so one must go deeper to see any influence that primary elections systems had. I took all forty-eight primaries that I analyzed in this paper and sorted them by the winner overall, among Party-IDs, among Ind-IDs, and among Other Party-IDs (table 20). As is already very apparent, all three eventual nominees enjoyed strong support among their Party-IDs. Bush, Gore, and Kerry won Party-IDs in forty-four of forty-eight races. Of the other four states, two were favorite-son victories (McCain in Arizona and Dean in Vermont). Thus Party-IDs were the final decision-makers in all three contests.

However, all three nominees received much less support among Ind-IDs. Bush won them in only one of seventeen races, and Gore in five of thirteen. Kerry did best, carrying Ind-IDs in eleven of eighteen states, but even that was notably lower than his Party-ID victories. This means that overall, in a significant thirty-one of forty-eight primaries, eventual losing candidates won Ind-IDs. Not only that but in the twenty primaries in which the other party's Party-IDs comprised

a statistically significant percentage, eventual losing candidates won them in all but two. The lesson to be learned from this is that non-Party-IDs can and in these cases did vote differently than Party-IDs, and that gap can go from only moderate (as with Kerry) to massive (as with Bush).

This means that while non-Party-IDs were not determinative in these three races, the potential inherently exists that they could be in the future. In so far as Party-IDs and non-Party-IDs vote differently, the presence of non-Party-IDs within the voter pool could swing an election. In six of the forty-eight states, the candidate who lost among Party-IDs won the primary. Importantly, they all occurred in one contest: McCain won overall in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont while losing Party-IDs. Thus in a contest in which Party-IDs are more divided (for instance if Party-IDs are split between several candidates while one had united non-Party-IDs), the swing of several states like this could decide the outcome. In short, Party-IDs selected the nominee in these three races, but there is a genuine chance that that might not occur in the future. The next question is the extent to which primary election systems affect that likelihood.

Do Primary Election Systems Affect the Party-ID Percentage? The answer has been routinely yes throughout the three case studies. I combined the Party-ID, Ind-ID, and Other Party-ID percentages from the primaries that I analyzed and divided them by primary election system (table 21). In the sixteen closed primaries, the Party-ID percentage was definitely the highest, ranging from 72% to 85%. The median was 81% and the mean was 80%. Among the thirteen semiclosed primaries, the Party-ID percentage never exceeded 75% and went as low as 37%. The median was a considerably lower 61% and the mean 59%. Open primaries (contrary to

my hypothesis) had Party-ID percentages that were actually a bit higher than semiclosed primaries although they were still distinctly lower than closed primaries, ranging from 81% to 48% with a median of 69% and mean of 66%.

Looking at it the other way, the Ind-ID percentage was clearly lowest for closed primaries, which had a median of 16% and mean of 17%. Open primaries were substantially higher with a 24% median and 27% mean, and semiclosed primaries were even higher with a median of 36% and mean of 37%. Interestingly, despite having significantly lower Ind-ID percentages than semiclosed primaries, open primaries had notably higher Other Party-ID percentages. Their median was 6% with a mean of 7%. Semiclosed had a median and mean of 3% each, and closed had a median of 2% and mean of 3%. In short, both semiclosed and open primaries had significantly lower Party-ID percentages than closed primaries. This helps to answer the initial question of how much outsiders would utilize more accessible primaries. This data suggests that they neither would stay at home and have no effect nor completely overrun Party-IDs. Rather they usually cast a significant minority of the vote and on occasion (as happened four times in this analysis) actually become a majority.

To summarize this data, in closed presidential primaries, non-Party-IDs still cast approximately one fifth of the vote on average (because they had not bothered to reregister or for some other reason). In open states, the non-Party-ID percentage rose to about a third on average, and among semiclosed states, (contrary to my expectations) they rose even farther to average two-fifths. While my sample of races in this paper is certainly limited and only speaks for presidential primaries, the differences between these systems are significant. Primary election systems clearly affect the Party-ID percentage and do so considerably. Therefore, because Party-

IDs and non-Party-IDs can vote differently (sometimes quite differently), primary election systems could have a determinative effect in a closer contest.

Do Primary Election Systems Affect the Crossover Type? Unfortunately, the data did little to answer this question. My most important discovery was that on Super Tuesday in 2000, hedgers and raiders together comprised percentages in at least the mid-single digits. However, while little data proving crossover type was available, I also never came across anything to indicate that either of the two most controversial types (hedging and raiding) was anything close to widespread. Ultimately, for better answers to be available, exit pollsters will have to ask more pertinent questions.

Conclusion

Based on this analysis, non-Party-IDs can vote (sometimes very) differently from Party-IDs, and open and semiclosed primaries on average increase the number of non-Party-IDs by a significant although usually not overwhelming amount. What policymakers should do about this is fundamentally a normative question. On the one hand, we can adopt closed primaries to maximize the influence of committed members (although even this will not bring the Party-ID percentage to 100%). On the other hand, we can choose open or semiclosed primaries to make the nominating process more accessible to and influenced by all voters. The current split between states on this issue shows that it will continue to be debated for the foreseeable future.

Regrettably, it will be difficult to examine the pros and cons of either side outside of current political realities. On a presidential level, the simple fact of the matter is that some potential 2008 candidates are more likely to benefit from closed primaries (such as Allen,

Brownback, Frist, Huckabee, Romney, Clinton, and Kerry). Others would probably do better in semiclosed and open primaries (including Giuliani, Hagel, McCain, Bayh, Edwards, Feingold and Warner). Supporters of these candidates will be tempted to do what is advantageous for the next election, and that reality will continue to be true for future elections. Likewise, all sorts of lower-level elected officials, seeking to avoid primary challenges and possibly aspiring to higher office, hardly have a detached view of the issue. Thus it will be very hard for unbiased policy to be made. It will be still harder to debate properly the more fundamental questions surrounding this issue, such as whether these primaries should even be occurring as part of a two-party system. Could not a multiparty system better facilitate both goals by allowing people to form closed parties and also by giving all voters more options and thus more ability to be involved in nominating processes? I do not know the answer, but it would be unfortunate to argue over primary election systems without tackling this deeper question.

Ultimately, the debate over primary election systems is an important one and could have important future implications. While it was not determinative in 2000 or 2004, the fact that non-Party-IDs can vote differently from Party-IDs and that primary election systems considerably affect the percentage of votes coming from each group is significant. The reality is that our choice of primary election systems could be determinative in selecting our president. We should therefore choose wisely.

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Table 1. Results and exit polling from the February 1-8, 2000 Republican primaries.								
		Party-ID				Party-Reg		
Name	Actual	Rep	Ind	Dem	Other	Rep	Ind	Unreg.
February 1								
New Hampshire (Semiclosed)								
	100%	53%	41%	4%	1%	63%	32%	5%
McCain	49%	38%	62%	78%	-	44%	61%	44%
Bush	30%	41%	19%	13%	-	35%	19%	41%
Forbes	13%	12%	12%	2%	-	12%	12%	11%
Keyes	6%	8%	6%	3%	-	7%	7%	4%
Bauer	1%	1%	1%	0%	-	1%	1%	0%
February 8								
Delaware (Closed)								
	100%	80%	18%	2%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bush	51%	56%	26%	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
McCain	25%	21%	45%	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
Forbes	20%	19%	25%	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
Keyes	4%	4%	4%	-	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 2. Results and exit polling from the February 19-29, 2000 Republican primaries.								
		Party-ID			Voted in Rep. Primary Before?		Preferred Primary Type	
Name	Actual	Rep	Ind	Dem	Yes	No	Closed	Open
February 19								
South Carolina (Open)								
	100%	61%	30%	9%	68%	31%	NA	NA
Bush	53%	69%	34%	18%	59%	42%	NA	NA
McCain	42%	26%	60%	79%	36%	53%	NA	NA
Keyes	5%	5%	6%	3%	5%	5%	NA	NA
February 22								
Arizona (Closed)								
	100%	80%	18%	2%	79%	20%	NA	NA
McCain	60%	56%	72%	-	60%	56%	NA	NA
Bush	36%	41%	20%	-	35%	39%	NA	NA
Keyes	4%	4%	5%	-	4%	3%	NA	NA
Michigan (Open)								
	100%	48%	35%	17%	68%	30%	NA	NA
McCain	51%	29%	67%	82%	46%	64%	NA	NA
Bush	43%	66%	26%	10%	48%	30%	NA	NA
Keyes	5%	6%	5%	4%	5%	4%	NA	NA
February 29								
Virginia (Open)								
	100%	63%	29%	8%	NA	NA	48%	49%
Bush	53%	69%	31%	11%	NA	NA	81%	26%
McCain	44%	28%	64%	87%	NA	NA	16%	71%
Keyes	3%	3%	4%	2%	NA	NA	4%	3%

Table 3. Results and exit polling from the March 7, 2000 Republican primaries.															
Name	Party-ID			Party-Reg			Voted in Rep. Primary Before?		Preferred Primary Type		General Election (Bush v. Gore)		General Election (McCain v. Gore)		
	Actual	Rep	Ind	Dem	Rep	Ind	Unreg.	Yes	No	Closed	Open	Bush	Gore	McCain	Gore
March 7															
California (Closed—Just Rep-Regs Surveyed)															
	100%	82%	16%	2%	NA	NA	NA	94%	6%	NA	NA	84%	11%	82%	6%
Bush	61%	63%	41%	-	NA	NA	NA	57%	-	NA	NA	67%	6%	53%	-
McCain	35%	32%	50%	-	NA	NA	NA	38%	-	NA	NA	27%	89%	42%	-
Keyes	4%	4%	5%	-	NA	NA	NA	4%	-	NA	NA	5%	2%	5%	-
Connecticut (Closed)															
	100%	72%	26%	3%	NA	NA	NA	79%	21%	53%	44%	72%	20%	81%	9%
McCain	49%	39%	69%	-	NA	NA	NA	48%	52%	32%	68%	35%	85%	55%	24%
Bush	46%	56%	25%	-	NA	NA	NA	48%	41%	63%	27%	60%	9%	40%	62%
Keyes	3%	4%	3%	-	NA	NA	NA	3%	3%	4%	3%	3%	4%	3%	7%
Georgia (Open)															
	100%	62%	29%	8%	NA	NA	NA	84%	16%	38%	60%	84%	11%	75%	11%
Bush	67%	77%	52%	45%	NA	NA	NA	72%	43%	82%	57%	76%	13%	63%	71%
McCain	28%	19%	41%	54%	NA	NA	NA	23%	54%	10%	40%	19%	84%	32%	25%
Keyes	5%	5%	6%	1%	NA	NA	NA	5%	3%	7%	3%	5%	2%	4%	4%
Maine (Semiclosed)															
	100%	66%	31%	3%	84%	14%	2%	83%	17%	NA	NA	75%	17%	78%	11%
Bush	51%	63%	33%	-	56%	23%	-	54%	34%	NA	NA	65%	7%	45%	58%
McCain	44%	33%	62%	-	39%	73%	-	40%	63%	NA	NA	30%	85%	51%	25%
Keyes	3%	3%	2%	-	3%	2%	-	3%	2%	NA	NA	4%	1%	3%	3%

Table 3 (cont'd). Results and exit polling from the March 7, 2000 Republican primaries.

Name	Actual	Party-ID			Party-Reg			Voted in Rep. Primary Before?		Preferred Primary Type		General Election (Bush v. Gore)		General Election (McCain v. Gore)	
		Rep	Ind	Dem	Rep	Ind	Unreg.	Yes	No	Closed	Open	Bush	Gore	McCain	Gore
March 7															
Maryland (Semiclosed)															
	100%	69%	28%	3%	87%	13%	NA	81%	19%	NA	NA	77%	17%	76%	13%
Bush	56%	66%	33%	-	59%	32%	NA	59%	40%	NA	NA	69%	9%	50%	71%
McCain	36%	27%	59%	-	33%	63%	NA	33%	53%	NA	NA	23%	85%	43%	24%
Keyes	7%	7%	8%	-	8%	3%	NA	7%	7%	NA	NA	7%	6%	7%	5%
Massachusetts (Semiclosed)															
	100%	37%	54%	8%	38%	62%	NA	74%	26%	NA	NA	57%	31%	80%	11%
McCain	65%	43%	75%	88%	48%	76%	NA	58%	85%	NA	NA	45%	93%	71%	55%
Bush	32%	54%	21%	8%	49%	21%	NA	39%	13%	NA	NA	51%	5%	26%	42%
Keyes	3%	3%	2%	2%	3%	3%	NA	3%	2%	NA	NA	4%	1%	3%	2%
Missouri (Open)															
	100%	61%	29%	10%	NA	NA	NA	72%	28%	34%	62%	77%	17%	75%	11%
Bush	58%	72%	43%	21%	NA	NA	NA	65%	43%	80%	48%	73%	10%	53%	65%
McCain	35%	21%	49%	76%	NA	NA	NA	28%	49%	13%	46%	20%	86%	40%	29%
Keyes	6%	6%	6%	3%	NA	NA	NA	5%	7%	7%	5%	6%	3%	6%	3%
New York (Closed)															
	100%	74%	23%	3%	NA	NA	NA	74%	26%	NA	NA	74%	19%	77%	11%
Bush	51%	57%	33%	-	NA	NA	NA	53%	45%	NA	NA	65%	11%	44%	61%
McCain	43%	38%	58%	-	NA	NA	NA	41%	50%	NA	NA	28%	86%	50%	30%
Keyes	3%	4%	5%	-	NA	NA	NA	4%	5%	NA	NA	5%	2%	4%	4%

Table 3 (cont'd). Results and exit polling from the March 7, 2000 Republican primaries.

Name	Party-ID			Party-Reg			Voted in Rep. Primary Before?		Preferred Primary Type		General Election (Bush v. Gore)		General Election (McCain v. Gore)		
	Actual	Rep	Ind	Dem	Rep	Ind	Unreg.	Yes	No	Closed	Open	Bush	Gore	McCain	Gore
March 7															
Ohio (Open)															
	100%	69%	24%	7%	NA	NA	NA	82%	18%	32%	67%	80%	15%	76%	12%
Bush	58%	68%	37%	30%	NA	NA	NA	63%	36%	77%	49%	71%	6%	51%	74%
McCain	37%	28%	56%	66%	NA	NA	NA	33%	57%	18%	46%	25%	84%	45%	17%
Keyes	4%	3%	4%	4%	NA	NA	NA	3%	6%	5%	4%	3%	6%	3%	7%
Rhode Island (Semiclosed)															
	100%	40%	53%	6%	38%	62%	NA	74%	26%	NA	NA	62%	29%	81%	10%
McCain	60%	42%	72%	-	42%	73%	NA	55%	81%	NA	NA	40%	94%	64%	-
Bush	36%	57%	24%	-	55%	24%	NA	42%	17%	NA	NA	56%	4%	34%	-
Keyes	3%	1%	4%	-	2%	3%	NA	3%	2%	NA	NA	3%	1%	2%	-
Vermont (Open)															
	100%	50%	42%	8%	NA	NA	NA	81%	19%	26%	73%	63%	28%	81%	11%
McCain	60%	44%	74%	81%	NA	NA	NA	57%	73%	30%	71%	41%	93%	66%	46%
Bush	35%	51%	23%	19%	NA	NA	NA	39%	23%	64%	26%	54%	6%	31%	52%
Keyes	3%	3%	2%	0%	NA	NA	NA	3%	2%	5%	2%	4%	1%	2%	3%

Table 4. Results from the March 7, 2000 California Republican Primary by Party-Reg.

Party (% of total)	Bush		McCain		Keyes		Other	
Republican (68.6%)	1,725,162	61%	988,706	35%	112,747	4%	21,306	1%
Democratic (19.1%)	247,411	34%	510,357	61%	29,570	4%	6,572	1%
American Independent (1.4%)	22,661	39%	31,363	54%	3,595	6%	717	1%
Reform (0.5%)	5,404	24%	15,552	68%	1,454	6%	275	1%
Libertarian (0.4%)	5,094	29%	10,165	58%	1,923	11%	274	2%
Green (0.2%)	1,035	13%	6,414	81%	360	5%	77	1%
Natural Law (0.1%)	1,391	40%	1,841	53%	229	7%	45	1%
Decline to State (9.7%)	160,308	40%	216,172	54%	20,564	5%	4,949	1%
TOTAL (100.0%)	2,168,466	52%	1,780,570	43%	170,442	4%	34,215	1%

Note: Does not count nine votes cast for registered write-in candidates.

Table 5. Analysis of some crossover types in the March 7, 2000 Republican primaries. Groups that did not produce a statistically significant sample are marked "NA." (Other crossover groups likely exist that are not included in this analysis.)

	Sincere, Hedgers, or Raiders			Hedgers or Raiders		
State	Those who voted for McCain and would support Gore over Bush	Those who voted for Bush and would support Gore over McCain	Total	Those who voted for McCain and would support Gore over McCain	Those who voted for Bush and would support Gore over Bush	Total
Closed Primaries						
California	10%	NA	>10%	NA	1%	>1%
Connecticut	17%	6%	23%	2%	2%	4%
New York	16%	7%	23%	3%	2%	5%
Semiclosed Primaries						
Maine	14%	6%	20%	3%	1%	4%
Maryland	14%	9%	23%	3%	2%	5%
Massachusetts	29%	5%	34%	6%	2%	8%
Rhode Island	27%	NA	>27%	NA	1%	>1%
Open Primaries						
Georgia	9%	8%	17%	3%	1%	4%
Missouri	15%	7%	22%	3%	2%	5%
Ohio	13%	9%	22%	2%	1%	3%
Vermont	26%	6%	32%	5%	2%	7%

Table 6. The winner and primary election system of the seventeen contested 2000 Republican primaries that are analyzed in this paper. States are ranked by their Rep-ID percentage.

State	% from Rep-IDs	% from Rep-Regs	Primary Type	Winner
California	82%	100%	Closed	Bush
Arizona	80%	100%	Closed	McCain
Delaware	80%	100%	Closed	Bush
New York	74%	100%	Closed	Bush
Connecticut	72%	100%	Closed	McCain
Maryland	69%	87%	Semiclosed	Bush
Ohio	69%	-	Open	Bush
Maine	66%	84%	Semiclosed	Bush
Virginia	63%	-	Open	Bush
Georgia	62%	-	Open	Bush
Missouri	61%	-	Open	Bush
South Carolina	61%	-	Open	Bush
New Hampshire	53%	63%	Semiclosed	McCain
Vermont	50%	-	Open	McCain
Michigan	48%	-	Open	McCain
Rhode Island	40%	38%	Semiclosed	McCain
Massachusetts	37%	38%	Semiclosed	McCain
Median	63%			
Mean	63%			

Table 7. Results and exit polling from the February 1-5, 2000 Democratic primaries.								
		Party-ID				Party-Reg		
Name	Actual	Dem	Ind	Rep	Other	Dem	Ind	Unreg.
February 1								
New Hampshire (Semiclosed)								
	100%	56%	40%	3%	1%	65%	30%	5%
Gore	50%	59%	41%	-	-	55%	39%	46%
Bradley	46%	41%	56%	-	-	43%	59%	53%
February 5								
Delaware (Closed)								
	100%	75%	23%	2%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gore	57%	60%	51%	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bradley	40%	37%	45%	-	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 8. Results and exit polling from the March 7, 2000 Democratic primaries.

Name	Party-ID			Party-Reg			Voted in Dem Primary Before		General Election (Gore v. Bush)		General Election (Gore v. McCain)		
	Actual	Dem	Ind	Rep	Dem	Ind	Unreg.	Yes	No	Gore	Bush	Gore	McCain
March 7													
California (Closed—Just Dem-Regs Surveyed)													
	100%	85%	13%	2%	NA	NA	NA	92%	8%	95%	2%	88%	7%
Gore	81%	82%	64%	-	NA	NA	NA	81%	-	83%	-	85%	41%
Bradley	18%	17%	35%	-	NA	NA	NA	19%	-	16%	-	14%	57%
Connecticut (Closed)													
	100%	77%	20%	3%	NA	NA	NA	88%	12%	81%	11%	66%	28%
Gore	55%	60%	39%	-	NA	NA	NA	56%	49%	63%	14%	70%	24%
Bradley	42%	38%	54%	-	NA	NA	NA	41%	47%	36%	76%	29%	71%
Georgia (Open)													
	100%	81%	17%	2%	NA	NA	NA	91%	9%	91%	6%	88%	9%
Gore	84%	88%	68%	-	NA	NA	NA	84%	-	88%	-	90%	-
Bradley	16%	12%	32%	-	NA	NA	NA	16%	-	12%	-	10%	-
Maine (Semiclosed)													
	100%	69%	29%	2%	90%	9%	1%	84%	16%	83%	11%	66%	30%
Gore	54%	60%	43%	-	56%	-	-	55%	50%	63%	15%	69%	25%
Bradley	41%	36%	53%	-	40%	-	-	41%	44%	36%	64%	29%	66%
Maryland (Closed)													
	100%	80%	16%	3%	NA	NA	NA	92%	8%	83%	13%	74%	22%
Gore	67%	74%	42%	-	NA	NA	NA	67%	69%	77%	18%	81%	24%
Bradley	28%	23%	48%	-	NA	NA	NA	29%	29%	22%	64%	17%	66%
Massachusetts (Semiclosed)													
	100%	67%	29%	4%	76%	24%	NA	90%	10%	84%	10%	71%	24%
Gore	60%	65%	53%	-	62%	53%	NA	61%	55%	68%	15%	72%	27%
Bradley	37%	33%	43%	-	35%	45%	NA	37%	40%	31%	72%	27%	63%

Table 8 (cont'd). Results and exit polling from the March 7, 2000 Democratic primaries.													
Name	Actual	Party-ID			Party-Reg			Voted in Dem Primary Before		General Election (Gore v. Bush)		General Election (Gore v. McCain)	
		Dem	Ind	Rep	Dem	Ind	Unreg.	Yes	No	Gore	Bush	Gore	McCain
March 7													
Missouri (Open)													
	100%	78%	16%	6%	NA	NA	NA	77%	23%	84%	11%	71%	22%
Gore	65%	70%	44%	-	NA	NA	NA	65%	67%	71%	39%	78%	30%
Bradley	34%	28%	51%	-	NA	NA	NA	33%	32%	28%	55%	21%	64%
New York (Closed)													
	100%	80%	18%	2%	NA	NA	NA	88%	12%	88%	7%	76%	20%
Gore	66%	70%	46%	-	NA	NA	NA	66%	61%	71%	17%	76%	26%
Bradley	33%	29%	50%	-	NA	NA	NA	34%	36%	29%	77%	24%	71%
Ohio (Open)													
	100%	77%	21%	3%	NA	NA	NA	91%	9%	83%	11%	77%	19%
Gore	74%	80%	52%	-	NA	NA	NA	74%	-	81%	38%	85%	28%
Bradley	25%	19%	43%	-	NA	NA	NA	24%	-	18%	59%	14%	65%
Rhode Island (Semiclosed)													
	100%	60%	38%	1%	73%	27%	NA	88%	12%	84%	9%	69%	26%
Gore	57%	65%	43%	-	61%	43%	NA	57%	-	63%	-	69%	28%
Bradley	40%	33%	55%	-	36%	56%	NA	41%	-	35%	-	30%	68%
Vermont (Open)													
	100%	58%	39%	3%	NA	NA	NA	88%	12%	87%	9%	72%	22%
Gore	54%	60%	49%	-	NA	NA	NA	56%	47%	61%	-	66%	28%
Bradley	44%	39%	50%	-	NA	NA	NA	43%	52%	38%	-	34%	68%

Table 9. Analysis of how Ind-IDs and Ind-Regs broke between the parties in the ten March 7, 2000 primaries that (a) had both Democratic and Republican contests and (b) had the same primary election system for both parties. States are listed alphabetically.

	Column A	Column B	Column C	Column D	Column E	Column F	Column G
State	% of Rep Primary vote coming from Ind-IDs (or Ind-Regs)	% of Dem Primary vote coming from Ind-IDs/Regs	Gap in Ind-ID/Reg % [greater Rep % is positive]	# of people voting in Rep Primary	# of people voting in Dem Primary	# of Ind-IDs/Regs voting in Rep Primary [A*D] (% of total Ind ID/Reg vote)	# of Ind-IDs/Regs voting in Rep Primary [B*E] (% of total Ind ID/Reg vote)
Closed Primaries							
California	16%	13%	+3%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Connecticut	26%	20%	+6%	NA	NA	NA	NA
New York	23%	18%	+5%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Open Primaries							
Georgia	29%	17%	+12%	643,188	284,431	190,000 (80%)	48,000 (20%)
Missouri	29%	16%	+13%	475,363	265,489	140,000 (77%)	42,000 (23%)
Ohio	24%	21%	+3%	1,397,528	978,512	340,000 (62%)	210,000 (38%)
Vermont	42%	39%	+3%	81,355	49,283	34,000 (64%)	19,000 (36%)
Semiclosed Primaries (by Ind-ID)							
Maine	31%	29%	+2%	96,624	64,279	30,000 (61%)	19,000 (39%)
Massachusetts	54%	29%	+25%	502,932	571,527	270,000 (61%)	170,000 (39%)
Rhode Island	53%	38%	+25%	36,149	47,085	19,000 (51%)	18,000 (49%)
Semiclosed Primaries (by Ind-Reg)							
Maine	14%	9%	+5%	96,624	64,279	14,000 (70%)	6,000 (30%)
Massachusetts	62%	24%	+38%	502,932	571,527	310,000 (69%)	140,000 (31%)
Rhode Island	62%	27%	+35%	36,149	47,085	22,000 (63%)	13,000 (37%)

Table 10. Results from the March 7, 2000 California Democratic Primary by Party-Reg.						
Party (% of total)	Gore		Bradley		Other	
Democratic (81.1%)	2,155,321	81%	482,882	18%	15,911	1%
Republican (7.1%)	167,773	73%	61,714	27%	1,364	1%
American Independent (1.1%)	26,675	73%	8,222	26%	210	1%
Green (0.5%)	10,176	62%	6,275	38%	38	0%
Reform (0.3%)	6,681	71%	2,643	28%	71	1%
Libertarian (0.2%)	4,500	67%	2,196	32%	66	1%
Natural Law (0.2%)	4,557	80%	1,076	19%	41	1%
Decline to State (9.6%)	234,267	75%	77,646	25%	1,718	1%
TOTAL (100.0%)	2,609,950	80%	642,654	20%	19,419	1%
<i>Note: Does not count six votes cast for registered write-in candidates.</i>						

Table 11. Analysis of crossover types in the March 7, 2000 Democratic primaries. Groups that did not produce a statistically significant sample are marked "NA." (Other crossover groups likely exist that are not included in this analysis.)

	Sincere, Hedgers, or Raiders			Hedgers or Raiders		
State	**May Overlap**		Total	**May Overlap**		Total
	Those who voted for Bradley and would support McCain over Gore	Those who voted for Bradley and would support Bush over Gore		Those who voted for Gore and would support McCain over Gore	Those who voted for Gore and would support Bush over Gore	
Closed Primaries						
California	4%	NA	>4%	3%	NA	>3%
Connecticut	20%	8%	20%-28%	7%	2%	7%-9%
Maryland	15%	8%	15%-23%	5%	2%	5%-7%
New York	14%	5%	14%-19%	5%	1%	5%-6%
Semiclosed Primaries						
Maine	20%	7%	20%-27%	8%	2%	8%-10%
Massachusetts	15%	7%	15%-22%	6%	2%	6%-8%
Rhode Island	18%	NA	>18%	7%	NA	>7%
Open Primaries						
Georgia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Missouri	14%	6%	14%-20%	7%	4%	7%-11%
Ohio	12%	6%	12%-18%	5%	4%	5%-9%
Vermont	15%	NA	>15%	6%	NA	>6%

Table 12. Gore's percentage in and the primary election system of the thirteen contested 2000 Democratic primaries that are analyzed in this paper. States are ranked by their Dem-ID percentage.

State	% from Dem-IDs	% from Dem-Regs	Primary Type	% Voting for Gore
California	85%	100%	Closed	81%
Georgia	81%	-	Open	84%
New York	80%	100%	Closed	66%
Maryland	80%	100%	Closed	67%
Missouri	78%	-	Open	65%
Connecticut	77%	100%	Closed	55%
Ohio	77%	-	Open	74%
Delaware	75%	100%	Closed	57%
Maine	69%	90%	Semiclosed	54%
Massachusetts	67%	76%	Semiclosed	60%
Rhode Island	60%	73%	Semiclosed	57%
Vermont	58%	-	Open	54%
New Hampshire	56%	65%	Semiclosed	50%
Median	77%			
Mean	73%			

Table 13. Results and exit polling from the January 27, 2004 Democratic New Hampshire Primary.

		Party-ID			Party-Reg			
Name	Actual	Dem	Ind	Rep	Dem	Ind	Rep	Unreg.
January 27								
New Hampshire (Semiclosed)								
	100%	48%	48%	4%	45%	45%	4%	5%
Kerry	38%	41%	37%	29%	40%	36%	-	-
Dean	26%	29%	23%	8%	30%	25%	-	-
Clark	12%	11%	13%	10%	9%	12%	-	-
Edwards	12%	12%	13%	9%	13%	14%	-	-
Lieberman	9%	5%	12%	26%	7%	11%	-	-
Kucinich	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	-	-
Sharpton	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	-

Table 14. Results and exit polling from the February 3, 2004 Democratic primaries.									
		Party-ID					Party-ID		
Name	Total	Dem	Ind	Rep	Name	Total	Dem	Ind	Rep
February 3									
Arizona (Closed)					Delaware (Closed)				
	100%	83%	15%	2%		100%	83%	16%	2%
Kerry	43%	44%	33%	-	Kerry	50%	52%	42%	-
Clark	26%	27%	27%	-	Lieberman	11%	10%	15%	-
Dean	14%	14%	16%	-	Edwards	11%	11%	12%	-
Edwards	7%	7%	6%	-	Dean	10%	11%	11%	-
Lieberman	7%	6%	11%	-	Clark	10%	9%	12%	-
Kucinich	2%	1%	5%	-	Sharpton	6%	6%	5%	-
Sharpton	0%	0%	1%	-	Kucinich	1%	1%	1%	-
Missouri (Open)					Oklahoma (Closed)				
	100%	71%	23%	6%		100%	83%	11%	6%
Kerry	51%	56%	37%	30%	Clark	30%	32%	28%	13%
Edwards	25%	23%	28%	37%	Edwards	30%	28%	34%	30%
Dean	9%	8%	11%	8%	Kerry	27%	29%	18%	7%
Clark	4%	3%	8%	4%	Lieberman	7%	5%	9%	29%
Lieberman	4%	2%	7%	9%	Dean	4%	4%	5%	1%
Sharpton	3%	3%	3%	3%	Sharpton	1%	1%	2%	1%
Kucinich	1%	1%	2%	1%	Kucinich	1%	1%	3%	3%
South Carolina (Open)									
	100%	71%	24%	5%					
Edwards	45%	43%	48%	54%					
Kerry	30%	33%	22%	16%					
Sharpton	10%	9%	8%	7%					
Clark	7%	7%	8%	5%					
Dean	5%	5%	5%	6%					
Lieberman	2%	2%	5%	11%					
Kucinich	0%	0%	3%	1%					

Table 15. Results and exit polling from the February 10-17, 2004 Democratic primaries.								
		Party-ID			Voted in Primary Before?		Voted Ever Before?	
Name	Total	Dem	Ind	Rep	Yes	No	Yes	No
February 10								
Tennessee (Open)								
	100%	75%	20%	5%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Kerry	41%	46%	31%	20%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Edwards	27%	25%	32%	26%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Clark	23%	22%	25%	30%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Dean	4%	4%	7%	4%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sharpton	2%	2%	1%	5%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Kucinich	1%	1%	1%	2%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Virginia (Open)								
	100%	73%	22%	5%	74%	26%	98%	2%
Kerry	52%	57%	41%	13%	52%	48%	51%	-
Edwards	27%	23%	32%	48%	26%	28%	27%	-
Clark	9%	8%	12%	13%	9%	10%	10%	-
Dean	7%	7%	8%	13%	7%	9%	7%	-
Sharpton	3%	3%	3%	4%	4%	2%	3%	-
Kucinich	1%	1%	2%	0%	1%	1%	1%	-
February 17								
Wisconsin (Open)								
	100%	62%	29%	9%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Kerry	40%	48%	28%	18%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Edwards	34%	31%	40%	44%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Dean	18%	16%	21%	26%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Kucinich	3%	2%	6%	2%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sharpton	2%	1%	2%	1%	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 16. Results and exit polling from the March 2, 2004 Democratic primaries.									
		Party-ID					Party-ID		
Name	Total	Dem	Ind	Rep	Name	Total	Dem	Ind	Rep
March 2									
California (Semiclosed)					Connecticut (Closed)				
	100%	75%	21%	4%		100%	84%	15%	1%
Kerry	64%	70%	53%	33%	Kerry	58%	64%	41%	-
Edwards	20%	18%	23%	24%	Edwards	24%	24%	29%	-
Kucinich	5%	3%	6%	3%	Kucinich	3%	2%	9%	-
Sharpton	2%	2%	2%	1%	Sharpton	3%	2%	3%	-
Georgia (Open)					Maryland (Closed)				
	100%	71%	19%	10%		100%	82%	14%	4%
Kerry	47%	56%	32%	9%	Kerry	60%	66%	40%	20%
Edwards	41%	35%	51%	74%	Edwards	26%	23%	37%	37%
Sharpton	6%	6%	6%	7%	Sharpton	5%	5%	6%	0%
Kucinich	1%	0%	3%	2%	Kucinich	2%	2%	4%	0%
Massachusetts (Semiclosed)					New York (Closed)				
	100%	61%	36%	2%		100%	84%	14%	2%
Kerry	72%	81%	56%	-	Kerry	61%	66%	38%	-
Edwards	18%	12%	29%	-	Edwards	20%	18%	26%	-
Kucinich	4%	3%	6%	-	Sharpton	8%	8%	7%	-
Sharpton	1%	1%	1%	-	Kucinich	5%	3%	20%	-
Ohio (Open)					Rhode Island (Semiclosed)				
	100%	72%	24%	4%		100%	67%	32%	1%
Kerry	52%	58%	39%	30%	Kerry	71%	77%	59%	-
Edwards	34%	32%	42%	47%	Edwards	19%	16%	26%	-
Kucinich	9%	8%	13%	10%	Kucinich	3%	2%	5%	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vermont (Open)									
	100%	52%	43%	4%					
Dean (x)	54%	58%	59%	-					
Kerry	32%	38%	27%	-					
Kucinich	4%	1%	9%	-					
-	-	-	-	-					
-	-	-	-	-					

Table 17. Results from the March 2, 2004 California Democratic Primary by Party-Reg.

Party (% of total)	Kerry		Edwards		Kucinich		Sharpton		Other	
Democratic (93.3%)	1,886,019	65%	568,172	20%	125,319	4%	55,136	2%	265,610	9%
Decline to State (6.7%)	116,520	56%	46,269	22%	19,635	9%	4,190	2%	20,739	10%
TOTAL (100.0%)	2,002,539	64%	614,441	20%	144,954	5%	59,326	2%	286,349	9%

Note: Does not count twenty votes cast for registered write-in candidates.

Table 18. Kerry's margin of victory/loss in and the primary election system of the eighteen contested 2004 Democratic primaries that are analyzed in this paper. States are ranked by their Dem-ID percentage.

State	% from Dem-IDs	Primary Type	Kerry Margin
Connecticut	84%	Closed	34%
New York	84%	Closed	41%
Arizona	83%	Closed	17%
Delaware	83%	Closed	39%
Oklahoma	83%	Closed	(3%)
Maryland	82%	Closed	34%
California	75%	Semiclosed	44%
Tennessee	75%	Open	14%
Virginia	73%	Open	25%
Ohio	72%	Open	18%
Georgia	71%	Open	6%
Missouri	71%	Open	26%
South Carolina	71%	Open	(15%)
Rhode Island	67%	Semiclosed	52%
Wisconsin	62%	Open	6%
Massachusetts	61%	Semiclosed	54%
Vermont	52%	Open	(22%)
New Hampshire	48%	Semiclosed	12%
Median	73%		
Mean	72%		

Table 19. Analysis of the number of Ind-IDs who voted in Democratic primaries in 2000 and 2004. Excluded are states that (a) did not have a contest both years or (b) had a different primary election system for the two years.

	Column A	Column B	Column C	Column D	Column E	Column F	Column G
State	Total # voting in 2000	Ind-ID % in 2000	Total # voting in 2004	Ind-ID % in 2004	# of Ind-IDs voting in 2000 (A*B)	# of Ind-IDs voting in 2004 (C*D)	% change
Closed Primaries							
Connecticut	177,301	20%	130,023	15%	35,000	20,000	(43%)
Delaware	11,141	23%	33,291	16%	2,600	5,300	104%
Maryland	507,462	16%	481,476	14%	81,000	67,000	(17%)
New York	974,463	18%	715,633	14%	180,000	100,000	(44%)
Open Primaries							
Georgia	284,431	17%	626,813	19%	48,000	120,000	150%
Missouri	265,489	16%	418,339	23%	42,000	96,000	129%
Ohio	978,512	21%	1,221,026	24%	210,000	290,000	38%
Vermont	49,283	39%	82,881	43%	19,000	36,000	89%
Semiclosed Primaries							
Massachusetts	571,527	29%	615,188	36%	170,000	220,000	29%
New Hampshire	154,639	40%	219,787	48%	62,000	110,000	77%
Rhode Island	47,085	38%	35,759	32%	18,000	11,000	(39%)

Table 20. Total number of wins among Part-IDs, Ind-IDs, and Other Party-IDs.				
Candidate	Total Wins	Wins Among Party-IDs	Wins Among Ind-IDs	Wins Among Other Party-IDs
2000 Republican				
Bush	10	16	1	0
McCain	7	1	16	9
Not Statistically Significant	-	0	0	8
2000 Democratic				
Gore	13	13	5	0
Bradley	0	0	8	0
Not Statistically Significant	-	0	0	13
2004 Democratic				
Kerry	15	15	11	2
Edwards	1	1	6	8
Dean	1	1	1	0
Clark	1	1	0	1
Not Statistically Significant	-	0	0	7
Overall				
Eventual Winner	38	44	17	2
Other Candidates	10	4	31	18
Not Statistically Significant	-	0	0	28

Table 21. Analysis of Party-ID, Ind-ID, and Other Party-ID percentages by primary election system for all forty-eight primaries analyzed in this paper. States are ranked by Party-ID percentage. Medians are the true median within the column and not the middle of the column as ranked here. The same is true from minimum and maximum percentages.

State (Party-Year)	Party-IDs	Ind-IDs	Other Party-IDs	State (Party-Year)	Party-IDs	Ind-IDs	Other Party-IDs	State (Party-Year)	Party-IDs	Ind-IDs	Other Party-IDs
Closed (16)			Semiclosed (13)				Open (19)				
California (D-00)	85	13	2	California (D-04)	75	21	4	Georgia (D-00)	81	17	2
Connect. (D-04)	84	15	1	Maine (D-00)	69	29	2	Missouri (D-00)	78	16	6
New York (D-04)	84	14	2	Maryland (R-00)	69	28	3	Ohio (D-00)	77	21	3
Arizona (D-04)	83	15	2	Mass. (D-00)	67	29	4	Tenn. (D-04)	75	20	5
Delaware (D-04)	83	16	2	R. Island (D-04)	67	32	1	Virginia (D-04)	73	22	5
Oklahoma (D-04)	83	11	6	Maine (R-00)	66	31	3	Ohio (D-04)	72	24	4
California (R-00)	82	16	2	Mass. (D-04)	61	36	2	Georgia (D-04)	71	19	10
Maryland (D-04)	82	14	4	R. Island (D-00)	60	38	1	Missouri (D-04)	71	23	6
Arizona (R-00)	80	18	2	N. Hamp. (D-00)	56	40	3	S. Carol. (D-04)	71	24	5
Delaware (R-00)	80	18	2	N. Hamp. (R-00)	53	41	4	Ohio (R-00)	69	24	7
Maryland (D-00)	80	16	3	N. Hamp. (D-04)	48	48	4	Virginia (R-00)	63	29	8
New York (D-00)	80	18	2	R. Island (R-00)	40	53	6	Georgia (R-00)	62	29	8
Connect. (D-00)	77	20	3	Mass. (R-00)	37	54	8	Wiscon. (D-04)	62	29	9
Delaware (D-00)	75	23	2	-	-	-	-	Missouri (R-00)	61	29	10
New York (R-00)	74	23	3	-	-	-	-	S. Carol. (R-00)	61	30	9
Connect. (R-00)	72	26	3	-	-	-	-	Vermont (D-00)	58	39	3
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Vermont (D-04)	52	43	4
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Vermont (R-00)	50	42	8
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Michigan (R-00)	48	35	17
Max/Min/Min	85	11	1	"	75	21	1	"	81	16	2
Median	81	16	2	"	61	36	3	"	69	24	6
Mean	80	17	3	"	59	37	3	"	66	27	7
Min/Max/Max	72	26	6	"	37	54	8	"	48	43	17